A Refinement of Natural History

In aphorism 98 of Book One, Bacon discusses the format in which scientific observation is organized. This organization that Bacon calls "natural history" is pivotal to the construction of his New Organon. Mr. Stabenfeldt discussed the way in which the particulars should be observed by the individual, but Bacon in emphasized that there must also be a systematic way of cataloguing these particulars. He admits that Aristotle "composed so greatly a history of animals" but that his methodology was weak because it did not include "experiments of the mechanical arts". Therefore Bacon in Aphorism 102 declares that he has devised "Tables of Discovery". This differs from traditional natural history in that his Tables will unite observation and experiment; in practice the Tables are more a tool for the refinement of experiment and observation than a way of cataloguing discovered facts. Mr. Cameron Smith's blog post describes in more detail the relationship between these Tables and hypotheses.

In hindsight, we can say that Bacon's tables are faulty and outdated , but he himself realized that this was a possibility. In Aphorism 118 of Book One he admits that people may find mistakes or problems with his Natural Histories and Tables. He then goes on to say though that his method is more precise than "common natural history, which in comparison to mine is so negligent and inexact". He therefore sees his system as an improvement compared to previous attempts at natural history, and he has only his own ideas to work from.

What Bacon truly understands is that the structure for the cataloguing of scientific knowledge will shape the whole of the science as well as influencing the observation. This is apparent in light of how Darwin's theory of Natural Selection affected the biological and ecological sciences, particularly biological taxonomy.

Bacon & "True Axioms": Aphorism 4

This passage seems to further support the idea raised in class discussions of Bacon’s ideas of the relation between philosophy and utility. He again raises the point of philosophical ideas unrelated to the practical as “pernicious and inveterate habit(s) of dwelling on abstractions.” Beyond this, he discusses how exactly one would go about establishing some sort of axiom that a common man could use. He says that for something to be a “true and perfect rule of operation,” it will be “…certain, free, and disposing or leading to action.” He also finally suggests his own method or organon rather than continually criticizing ancient philosophy. Not only this, he seems to relate his idea of what a “true and perfect rule” is to an ancient idea in that of the Form (“and this is the same thing with the discovery of the true Form”). It’s interesting to me that he uses the language here that I would have expected him to continue to criticize since it would seem to be more related to theoretical philosophy rather than practical philosophy. Further, he says “For a true and perfect axiom of knowledge, then, the direction and precept will be, that another nature be discovered which is convertible within the given nature, and yet is a limitation of a more general nature, as of a true and real genus.” I think the key term in this sentence is “within” – that is, for the new “nature” or “Form” to be true, it must be directly related to the already existing “nature” in question. This would seem to be in line again with the idea that axioms should only be built around existing physical, “practical” natures.

Why Bacon Hated the Greeks

In the first book of The New Organon, Bacon presents a lot of history that needs to be rejected or, at least, ignored. In order to establish his own conception of how natural science should progress, Bacon has to show the value of his new method as well as the disadvantage of the old. The Greeks are Bacon's main challengers, so his attacks on the "darkness of antiquity" (122) are directed primarily against them. Because Bacon must demonstrate the necessity of his science and repudiate the old way of doing things, he is forced to maintain an anti-historical position that induces him to make candid and sometimes incorrect claims.

Bacon accuses the Greeks of many things, i.e. having overactive imaginations (65), jumping to conclusions (67), producing theories bereft of fruit (73), and being obsessed with profitless speculations (116), just to name a few. In light of his project, these objections are at least minimally plausible (as much as it pains me to say so). But in a few places Bacon's defense of method takes him too far. Look in section 77, where he calls the systems of Aristotle and Plato "planks of lighter and less solid material, [that] floated on the waves of time and were preserved." Believing that things as revered as the work of Plato and Aristotle were not worth the reverence and that the individuals throughout the ages had such poor judgment as to pick the less serious material to preserve is unusual. The mistrust is dangerous, and the lack of respect flagrant (especially after he claimed to be no match for them in the Preface). His mistrust of history is seen in his clear dismissal of figures like Herodotus and Plutarch (72).

Bacon also calls Plato and Aristotle sophists, grouping them with their intellectual antagonists. It is apt to say that - given the nature of the discipline to which the two men were committed - Bacon's interpretation is expected. Grouping Plato and Aristotle with those that they were explicitly against is not expected (and may not be intellectually respectable).

Lastly, Bacon's repudiation of history may be responsible for his comments on inventors and heroes. His claim that the benefits resulting from the action of heroes lasts only a few ages is a hasty one, if not an over-statement (129). A quick review of Greek history would lay bare that if not for heroes (such as those at Thermopylae), the entire history of the Western world would be changed.

Even though it is understandable that Bacon must reject the systems of ancient Greek thinkers, his eagerness to disregard history leads him to hasty statements and misguided conclusions about the importance and ability of his predecessors.

Bacon and Hypotheses

Bacon insists that in interpreting nature “we must prepare a Natural and Experimental History, sufficient and good, and this is the foundation of all. For we are not to imagine or suppose, but to discover, what nature does or may be made to do” (10). This seems to me to exclude the possibility of including a hypothesis (as a supposition based on limited evidence as a starting point for investigation) in such a method. He goes on to say that the understanding is unfit to deal with the natural and experimental history, even when it is ordered into Tables and Arrangements of Instances. Hence, he believes that only by his method of Induction should axioms be formed from the orderly arrangement of the particulars, and that such an arrangement should be made “without premature speculation” (11). (I know this goes beyond the assigned reading, but it’s one aphorism worth continuing to) In aphorism 15, Bacon states that when viewing the instances, induction must itself be at work in an attempt to find a nature within the instances. His reason for this is that “if the mind attempt this affirmatively from the first, as when left to itself it is always wont to do, the result will be fancies and guesses and notions ill defined, and axioms that must be mended every day…” This description of guesses and “axioms” sounds more like what we conceive of as a hypothesis. We are even told in our general science classes that a hypothesis is an educated guess. Furthermore, we know that scientists are commonly changing their hypotheses as each of them fail. So if Bacon doesn’t allow for a hypothesis as we conceive of it today, what does he suggest? It seems that he propounds a method that discovers the correct hypothesis by exclusion. We think of hypotheses as a starting point of investigation, a supposition that something is the case. Bacon seeks the correct hypothesis to be shown to him, not by guessing or supposing and testing a nature, but by discovering it by a sufficient number of negatives: “Man can only proceed at first by negatives and at last to end in affirmatives, after exclusion has been exhausted” (15).

Bacon on Human Understanding

"For no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself; the inquiry must be enlarged so as to become more general" - Aphorism 70

This excerpt from The New Organon struck me as strange, specifically because Bacon lists qualities and tendencies of human understanding in preceding and succeeding aphorisms. If we are to accept that the nature of a thing cannot be well observed by the thing itself then what do we make of his claims about human understanding? Maybe Bacon would not consider his claims to be successful at mining the nature of human understanding but rather helpful in knowing how it seems to behave or interact with the environment. He does not say that his observations are a result of some sort of experiment, so I am willing to accept them as speculations and move on.

Human Nature and Christianity

It seems to me that after reading Book One, Bacon gives his readers a fairly-definite view of human nature. Looking at the goal of science, we see that Bacon says: "I who make such frequent mention of works and refer everything to that end" (117). It seems clear that the goal of science is to produce works and that the goal of works is to increase humanities powers and abilites over nature: The true and lawful discovery goal of the sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers" (81) or "My purpose is to... extend more widely the limits, of the power and greatness in man" (116). Aside from this evidence we can see that Bacon thinks nature in the hands of man natuarally leads to growth and progress as if this is the type of thing that should happen with humans. In aphorism 74 Bacon says that what is founded on the womb of nature will continue to grow and draw nourishment from nature. This can be oddly contrasted to his bug illustrations (which I am using to prove a point far different than what Bacon intended with them). In aphorim 95 Bacon talks about ants, bees, and spiders all doing different types of work. If one thinks about these animals, however, it is curious to note that all the work of these animals and pretty much all animals is work of subsistance. Ants, bees, and spiders all do work to build shelters and feed themselves, but not much more. Humans, on the other hand, have the task of constantly expanding their own powers. This is different than the other animals. The place that Bacon gets this from is his Christianity. In the last pragraph of aphorism 129 he says that man should recover his "right over nature, which belongs to it by divine bequest, and let power be given to [the human race], the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion". This clears up (and simultaneously causes problems for) Bacon's view of human nature. God gave nature to man for man to rule over. Despite, all the Bible-verses Bacon uses to testify to his ideas it seems that one could bring up plenty of counter-examples. The two that come to mind are the Tower of Babel and the story of Cain and Abel. In the Tower of Babel humanity is punished for working together to make a name for themselves by reaching heaven in a tower. It seems to me that producing scientific works in which god's power in nature is subverted so that the greatness of humanity be extended is a parallel situation. Similarly in cain and Abel, Cain is punished by God for sacrificing his left overs after he had taken the best for himself. Again, Bacon's goal of science as making greater man's powers seems prallel to Cain. Bacon does not talk much of glorifying God with his reults only of uplifting man. If these things are true (and christianity only provides the appearance of a justification for the conquest of nature) then questions later asked by Nietzsche about why man wants power over things become much more relevant, as does any physchological/philosophical explanation of man's desire for power.

Aphorism 1: Off to a Difficult Start

For quick reference, here is the aphorism:

"Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything."

My initial goal is to dissect this exactly. Then to raise potential problems that I could not find the answers to later.

First, Bacon seems to assume a purpose to man's (human's) existence. This is apparently drawn from the only capacity that man has for understanding; observation of nature. As such, the purpose of man's reasoning ability is to do the only thing it is capable of. That is the capability to understand nature. One can immediately raise the question of why. Why is man only capable of understanding nature? In fact, can't man understand phenomena better then nature? I think the response that Bacon would give would definatly include the arguement that the more practical knowledge that one would gain from nature would be preferable and more usable. From this could he conclude that the usable is primary in our task? If so the nature of philosophy in general is under question. The purpose to discover the empirical truth seems secondary to what is immediatly most practical; is this not the opposite goal to what Bacon intends? I thought his goal was to describe another method of understanding that would clarify problems with past methods. I am more confused by making a large jump to observations being primary than I am concerned by the use of the knowledge gained by phenomenology. I would claim that one cannot know any of nature truely, but one can use the assumptions that understanding nature brings more than one can use the more exact study of phenomenology.

A Problem of Induction

Francis Bacon goes as far as to use the word evil to describe the philosophies that oppose the methods presented in The New Organon (66, 63). Even though Bacon viewed the type of rationalism proposed by Aristotle as a hindrance to human thought, it is only natural for one to come to this conclusion when he is fixed on the concept of utility and the promotion of what he refers to as works. If one is to recognize metaphysics, he is to cease any type of utility that Bacon would agree with. Although this might be the case, Bacon's inductive methods are contradictory towards his own goals, which he clearly states in the preface, "are to open a new way for understanding." There are in fact some obvious benefits of this system, particularly when opposing Aristotelian logic and considering the time in history. But, this is not to say that Bacons proposed methods are without fault.

The way I see it, there will always be a battle between the principle of empiricism and the principle of rationalism due to the simple fact that a false conclusion can come from true premises. This is something that inductive methods will have to deal with. (Perhaps Bacon does later in his writings)

Consider the relationship between voltage, resistance and current. V=I*R. This has been empirically verified and induced (particular--->generalization) to whats called Ohm's law. Suppose that, unknown to us, V=(S-T). Now, we have reached a false conclusion. In this case, Bacon's inductive methods have not only led us into the wrong, but they have stopped us from digging deeper towards the truth.

Additional thoughts for commentary:
Induction will always be based on a percentage of empirical verifications. As those verifications increase, the likelihood of its truthfulness increase. Any cases that are not tested are subject to the law of contradiction. Depending on Bacon's goal, this may or may not be seen as a problem. If he seeks truth, its problematic. But if he seeks utility, wouldn't matter.

The Proper Means of Observation

In his sixty ninth aphorism of The New Organon, Francis Bacon writes, “demonstrations truly are in effect the philosophies themselves and the sciences.” This claim is directed primarily to show the folly in which experiments are currently conducted, the method in which “the most general principles are first established and then intermediate axioms are tried and proved by them” (69). However, the ramifications of this claim stake much against more than simply the means of experimentation.

Bacon argues that the main problem within the past philosophies is that they too quickly form assertions and claims based on too little experimentation and on the bias of the will. To support his claim, Bacon calls on Aristotle several times (in aphorisms 63 and 67 especially) in regard to the manner in which he observed and experimented to form his axioms. According to Bacon, rather than consulting experience, Aristotle had first “determined the question according to his will” and then answered it to fit the mold of his presuppositions (63). Here and throughout, Bacon is stressing the importance of too little observation and demonstration.

Yet at the same time, Bacon continually stresses, “the human senses and understanding, weak as they are, are not to be deprived of their authority” (67). He does not hesitate to grant the reader examples of the human will’s overzealousness in laying down universal laws based on too small grounds, but he does nothing in the first seventy aphorisms to define what sufficient observation is. At what point of observation can we determine a middle axiom? From these, when can we determine a general rule of nature? Hopefully further reading will elicit an answer.

Language and Symbolization

In his 43rd aphorism, discussing Idols of the Market Place, Bacon laments the barrier that words and definitions present as obstructions to knowledge and understanding. Even definitions are of no assistance to the confused mind as they only lead further down rabbit trails of muddled explanations and ambiguous word choice.

Language, by it's very nature, is the verbal/written symbolization of an actual thing. In symbolizing a thing (be it an idea, concrete element, emotion, being, etc.), we take it further away from its essence and allow it to be interpreted by others as they will, thereby obfuscating its true meaning.

Bacon defines words as "symbols of notions" (14) and suggests that they "be derived from things by a more sure and guarded way" (18). Defining and understanding notions is paramount in his view because notions are the most base element of syllogisms. He creates a flow chart that demonstrates syllogisms comprised by propositions comprised by words, which are symbols of notions (14). However, even if his "more sure and guarded" methods are implemented for better defining words and notions, will true clarity and precision ever be obtained as long as these notions are rendered symbolically in language? No matter how clearly a word is defined, language will continue to dissemble meaning.

Truth and Utility

It is sometimes difficult to determine Bacon's ultimate goal in New Organon, to ascertain whether he is interested in utility or in understanding nature. Bacon criticizes ancient philosophy for studying “things which, even if true, can do but little for the welfare of mankind” (§66). Yet he also admonishes the chemists for turning “aside with overhasty and unseasonable eagerness to practice” instead of continuing to pursue disinterested “experiments of Light” that yield no Fruit (§70).

If we are to properly understand The New Organon, we must for the moment turn away from its specific content and quotations and instead focus on its broader, functional form. I propose that we understand The New Organon as a rhetorical appeal, a textual “infomercial” designed to “sell” Bacon's new inductive logic. The second part, then, is a demonstration of Bacon's product. Yet, like any good late-night As-Seen-On-TV commercial, Bacon begins his appeal by demonstrating that there is a problem, a problem which his product will solve most elegantly.

Bacon most clearly makes this kind of appeal in §85, when he states that instead of feeling pride and admiration for the impressive works of man already produced, we should instead “pity the condition of mankind, seeing that in a course of so many ages there has been so great a dearth and barrenness of arts and inventions.” Bacon is trying to convince us that there is a problem that needs solving, and in order to do so, he has to appeal to the utility of his method's practical uses.

Some philosophers of saintly intellectual integrity may be convinced by strict, logical appeals, but Bacon is well aware that the rest of us may need convincing by other means. Thus, whatever Bacon himself feels about truth, Bacon is forced to ground most of his arguments on utility in order to sell his new inductive method.

In fact, one could argue that Bacon himself actually does favor truth to utility. For example, the famous distinction between “experiments of Light” and “experiments of Fruit” in §70 is a rhetorical appeal to utility meant to convince would-be scientists to focus on the proper understanding and interpretation of nature rather than on practical works. In other words, Bacon grounds his arguments by appeal to utility in order to “sell” us the truth.

Bacon's Premise

Bacon’s admonition of the Aristotelian Sciences is persuasive in its argument and decisive in its conclusions. The experiment which Bacon suggests concentrates on deriving 'axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all,' and as he admits, is 'as yet untried.' It is clear that Bacon insists on allowing experiment to 'dwell duly and orderly' among nature so as to discern the 'quiescent principles whereby things are produced.' Bacon would perhaps be surprised to learn now just how far humanity has delved into these quiescent principles.

The astonishing aspect of modern science that has enabled it to obtain such results is the very premise that rests throughout Bacon’s argument; namely, that nature adheres to some regular form that may be observed and charted. It is this isolated and self-sustaining certainty of nature that supplies science with the ability to align observations to theories, thereby predicting and manipulating nature. In practice and daily experience, the immutability of nature seems banal, (for instance few are surprised by the boiling of water when heated), however to philosophy the systematic form of nature is astounding in that it appears to be guided by intangible principles to an assiduous degree, despite vast trenches of space and time separating individual events. It is easy to see how the firm fabric of experience would inspire Bacon to advocate experiment in obedience to experiment, and regretful that humans before his day were so myopic as to rely on much more restricted and faulty methods. I find reflections concerning the nature of the underlying principles of nature to be vexing- why and by what means such principles seem to command matter is an enigma. Natural philosophy is forever progressing on explaining them phenomenally, yet of the operations of the principles themselves I remain curiously interested.

Truth or Works?

In aphorism 73, Bacon writes, "Of all signs there is none more certain or more noble than that taken from fruits. For fruits and works are as it were sponsors and sureties for the truth of philosophy," and then later, "the system [of philosophy] should be judged of by its fruits, and pronounced frivolous if it be barren." These few statements reveal several things about Bacon. First, he believes that a true axiom naturally produces works. Secondly, the truthfulness of an axiom rests on the quality of the works. Since the science he inherited was "barren of works," it is no wonder he rejects the dogmas of the Ancients. But one wonders if Bacon is really after truth; perhaps he is more interested in producing works. The very fact that he believes that works are the standard by which a system is judged suggests a subordination of philosophy to this new method of natural science. Concerning natural science, Bacon's new method is unquestionably better at producing works than that of the Ancients. But natural science does not seem to be the only realm where truth is sought after; why neglect these other areas?

Bacon, Language, and λόγος

In sixty-sixth aphorism of Bacon’s New Organon, “forms” are placed into the category of “meaningless summaries of observations” (LXVI). It is to be assumed that these “meaningless summaries of observations” are constituted by the Greeks; also, any post-Greek science is assumed Greek in its foundations (LXXI). The idea of a “summary” is typically a linguistic reference; thus, it is of no surprise that the supposed errors of these “meaningless summaries of observations” seem to be inevitably imbedded into the ambiguities of the language of the time (a good example would be LX). Assuming that thinking is conditioned by language (LIX), current reason qua philosophy and science is presented by the text as “sophistic and unproductive.” With this proposed linguistic limitation, we are now faced with questions about the λόγος and the role of dialectic in general.

The “illusions of the marketplace,” (which are essentially linguistically constituted illusions) are “names without things” and names with poor definitions (the latter seems to be rooted in those “meaningless summaries of observations”). The method by which “things” are uncovered is that of observation (LX) and interpretation (I).’ “Names without things” then follow to be imagined and not observed (LX). Bacon’s text presents words as being contingent to the subjectivity of man’s everydayness (LIX). The present-at-hand properties that are experientially the most apparent quantitatively (LX) are masked in the same way.

On a side note, we enlightened (and undoubtedly post-Kantian) contemporaries could easily ask: “what about the thing in-itself (or nature in-itself)?” In the text, the “thing in-itself” is posited as a brute fact of “nature” (XLVIII) which is interpreted through observation of nature’s order, which can be done by either fact or inference (I).

In opposition to the Greek’s harmony of nature and the λόγος, Bacon's text presents language as being experientially subjective. The failure of the dialectic is attributed to, not only the limitations imposed by the subjective experiences of the interlocutors (XXIX), but by the “fundamental organization” of the interlocutors' minds (XXX). These “idols of the tribe” include: the supposition of a greater order (XLV), an unwillingness to rethink one’s intellectual position (XLVI), favoring those things which take the mind “by storm” (XLVII), being unable to set epistemological boundaries for things like infinity and the universe (XLVIII), the influences of emotions upon intellectual position (XLIX), the limited powers of the senses (L), and the mode of impression which carries thinkers off to abstraction, forms, etc. (LI). Another objection to dialectic is shown in the critique of Aristotle: if one has already decided upon a position, one’s position must first be challenged or questioned dialectically before it can be refuted (LXIII).

-C. M. Bodayle

Stuggling with the Chemists

After having read, along side each of you, through much of Francis Bacon’s The New Organon, and after sharing in our discussion on Wednesday, I find myself still fascinated by the notion of Bacon’s outlook on the sciences. Indeed, as I was reading and thinking I couldn’t help but notice his regular mention of the chemists as agents of foolhardy science (Aphorisms 29, 54, 64, 66, etc.). In fact, he distinguishes them from possessing any real science at all. All the same, Bacon’s argument is construed in such a way so as to elevate science and the discovery of knowledge through a new practice of observation and experiment. If so, the question then arises, to what extent do not chemists also make informed assumptions based on the observation of general axioms through the practice of induction? Now, granted, at Bacon’s time, the practice of chemistry may have been slightly more geared towards the study of alchemy (intended, perhaps, more for the spiritual edification of the scientist than for the discovery of the science), but my questions then becomes, for what reason does Bacon then attack the very inductive method he proposes? Is his frustration with the chemists limited strictly to his desire to “give to faith only that which is faith’s?” (65). Is he accusing the chemists of a dogma of seeking for “experiments of fruit” rather than “experiments of light?” (70). Is faith such an idealistic dogma? And if so, why, then, does he purport to take part in it? These are just some of the many questions that arise for me as I read my way through Bacon’s The New Organon. As a side note, as well, I know many of us are also in Proseminar at the moment. As such, having read Nietzsche’s “Preface” to Beyond Good and Evil, there’s a good bit of similarity between Bacon’s view of the chemists and Nietzsche’s view of astrologists. Any thoughts on this correlation?

Light

In Bacon’s New Organon he claims the current workings of the Philo-scientific community are flawed—trapped by logic in an endless circle of pursuit of that which does not exist. Mankind’s problem is he has invented idols which have guided his development. It is akin to a child looking to a story in order to learn how to mature. Bacon believes the advancement this way of searching produces has come to an end. He proposes we remove these idols that color our expedition into the secrets of nature, replacing them with truth. In section 70 in the middle of the third paragraph he says, “Now God on the first day of creation created light only, giving to that work an entire day, in which no material substance was created. So must we likewise from experience of every kind first endeavor to discover true causes and axioms; and seek for experiments of Light, not for experiments of Fruit.” What exactly does he mean by light and what does he mean by fruit?

Course and Blog Schedule

Here is the reading list for the semester reprinted from the Syllabus:

The EVEN group posts on EVEN weeks, while the ODD group posts ODD weeks. Aside from these 7 posts with your group, post one more time when you have something to contribute. Also, remember to comment on posts.

Monday                                                         Wednesday

-----                                                                  J13 Syllabus

EVEN J18 MLK Day                                         J20 Bacon NO I, 1-70

ODD  J25 Bacon 71- 108                                  J27 Bacon 109-130, II 1-11

EVEN F1 Descartes Discourse 1-3                 F3 Discourse 4-6

ODD  F8 Descartes Meditations 1-3            F10 Med 4-6

EVEN F15 Hobbes Leviathan Intro, 1-5      F17 Hobbes 6-9

ODD  F22 Hobbes 10-13                                 F24 Hobbes 14-16

EVEN M1 Hobbes 17-20                                  M3 Hobbes 21. 26, C.

      SPRING BREAK

ODD  M15 Locke 1-5                                        M17 Locke 6-9

EVEN M22 Rousseau                                       M23 Rousseau

ODD  M29 Hume Enquiry 1-4                        M31 Hume 5-7

EVEN A5 Hume 8-10                                       A7 Hume 11-12

ODD  A12 Kant Critique, Prefaces                 A14 Kant Intro

EVEN A19 Kant Space                                      A21 Kant Time

ODD  A26 Kant B deduction                           A28 Kant B Deduction

M3 Kant