A Refinement of Natural History

In aphorism 98 of Book One, Bacon discusses the format in which scientific observation is organized. This organization that Bacon calls "natural history" is pivotal to the construction of his New Organon. Mr. Stabenfeldt discussed the way in which the particulars should be observed by the individual, but Bacon in emphasized that there must also be a systematic way of cataloguing these particulars. He admits that Aristotle "composed so greatly a history of animals" but that his methodology was weak because it did not include "experiments of the mechanical arts". Therefore Bacon in Aphorism 102 declares that he has devised "Tables of Discovery". This differs from traditional natural history in that his Tables will unite observation and experiment; in practice the Tables are more a tool for the refinement of experiment and observation than a way of cataloguing discovered facts. Mr. Cameron Smith's blog post describes in more detail the relationship between these Tables and hypotheses.

In hindsight, we can say that Bacon's tables are faulty and outdated , but he himself realized that this was a possibility. In Aphorism 118 of Book One he admits that people may find mistakes or problems with his Natural Histories and Tables. He then goes on to say though that his method is more precise than "common natural history, which in comparison to mine is so negligent and inexact". He therefore sees his system as an improvement compared to previous attempts at natural history, and he has only his own ideas to work from.

What Bacon truly understands is that the structure for the cataloguing of scientific knowledge will shape the whole of the science as well as influencing the observation. This is apparent in light of how Darwin's theory of Natural Selection affected the biological and ecological sciences, particularly biological taxonomy.

Bacon & "True Axioms": Aphorism 4

This passage seems to further support the idea raised in class discussions of Bacon’s ideas of the relation between philosophy and utility. He again raises the point of philosophical ideas unrelated to the practical as “pernicious and inveterate habit(s) of dwelling on abstractions.” Beyond this, he discusses how exactly one would go about establishing some sort of axiom that a common man could use. He says that for something to be a “true and perfect rule of operation,” it will be “…certain, free, and disposing or leading to action.” He also finally suggests his own method or organon rather than continually criticizing ancient philosophy. Not only this, he seems to relate his idea of what a “true and perfect rule” is to an ancient idea in that of the Form (“and this is the same thing with the discovery of the true Form”). It’s interesting to me that he uses the language here that I would have expected him to continue to criticize since it would seem to be more related to theoretical philosophy rather than practical philosophy. Further, he says “For a true and perfect axiom of knowledge, then, the direction and precept will be, that another nature be discovered which is convertible within the given nature, and yet is a limitation of a more general nature, as of a true and real genus.” I think the key term in this sentence is “within” – that is, for the new “nature” or “Form” to be true, it must be directly related to the already existing “nature” in question. This would seem to be in line again with the idea that axioms should only be built around existing physical, “practical” natures.

Why Bacon Hated the Greeks

In the first book of The New Organon, Bacon presents a lot of history that needs to be rejected or, at least, ignored. In order to establish his own conception of how natural science should progress, Bacon has to show the value of his new method as well as the disadvantage of the old. The Greeks are Bacon's main challengers, so his attacks on the "darkness of antiquity" (122) are directed primarily against them. Because Bacon must demonstrate the necessity of his science and repudiate the old way of doing things, he is forced to maintain an anti-historical position that induces him to make candid and sometimes incorrect claims.

Bacon accuses the Greeks of many things, i.e. having overactive imaginations (65), jumping to conclusions (67), producing theories bereft of fruit (73), and being obsessed with profitless speculations (116), just to name a few. In light of his project, these objections are at least minimally plausible (as much as it pains me to say so). But in a few places Bacon's defense of method takes him too far. Look in section 77, where he calls the systems of Aristotle and Plato "planks of lighter and less solid material, [that] floated on the waves of time and were preserved." Believing that things as revered as the work of Plato and Aristotle were not worth the reverence and that the individuals throughout the ages had such poor judgment as to pick the less serious material to preserve is unusual. The mistrust is dangerous, and the lack of respect flagrant (especially after he claimed to be no match for them in the Preface). His mistrust of history is seen in his clear dismissal of figures like Herodotus and Plutarch (72).

Bacon also calls Plato and Aristotle sophists, grouping them with their intellectual antagonists. It is apt to say that - given the nature of the discipline to which the two men were committed - Bacon's interpretation is expected. Grouping Plato and Aristotle with those that they were explicitly against is not expected (and may not be intellectually respectable).

Lastly, Bacon's repudiation of history may be responsible for his comments on inventors and heroes. His claim that the benefits resulting from the action of heroes lasts only a few ages is a hasty one, if not an over-statement (129). A quick review of Greek history would lay bare that if not for heroes (such as those at Thermopylae), the entire history of the Western world would be changed.

Even though it is understandable that Bacon must reject the systems of ancient Greek thinkers, his eagerness to disregard history leads him to hasty statements and misguided conclusions about the importance and ability of his predecessors.

Bacon and Hypotheses

Bacon insists that in interpreting nature “we must prepare a Natural and Experimental History, sufficient and good, and this is the foundation of all. For we are not to imagine or suppose, but to discover, what nature does or may be made to do” (10). This seems to me to exclude the possibility of including a hypothesis (as a supposition based on limited evidence as a starting point for investigation) in such a method. He goes on to say that the understanding is unfit to deal with the natural and experimental history, even when it is ordered into Tables and Arrangements of Instances. Hence, he believes that only by his method of Induction should axioms be formed from the orderly arrangement of the particulars, and that such an arrangement should be made “without premature speculation” (11). (I know this goes beyond the assigned reading, but it’s one aphorism worth continuing to) In aphorism 15, Bacon states that when viewing the instances, induction must itself be at work in an attempt to find a nature within the instances. His reason for this is that “if the mind attempt this affirmatively from the first, as when left to itself it is always wont to do, the result will be fancies and guesses and notions ill defined, and axioms that must be mended every day…” This description of guesses and “axioms” sounds more like what we conceive of as a hypothesis. We are even told in our general science classes that a hypothesis is an educated guess. Furthermore, we know that scientists are commonly changing their hypotheses as each of them fail. So if Bacon doesn’t allow for a hypothesis as we conceive of it today, what does he suggest? It seems that he propounds a method that discovers the correct hypothesis by exclusion. We think of hypotheses as a starting point of investigation, a supposition that something is the case. Bacon seeks the correct hypothesis to be shown to him, not by guessing or supposing and testing a nature, but by discovering it by a sufficient number of negatives: “Man can only proceed at first by negatives and at last to end in affirmatives, after exclusion has been exhausted” (15).

Bacon on Human Understanding

"For no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself; the inquiry must be enlarged so as to become more general" - Aphorism 70

This excerpt from The New Organon struck me as strange, specifically because Bacon lists qualities and tendencies of human understanding in preceding and succeeding aphorisms. If we are to accept that the nature of a thing cannot be well observed by the thing itself then what do we make of his claims about human understanding? Maybe Bacon would not consider his claims to be successful at mining the nature of human understanding but rather helpful in knowing how it seems to behave or interact with the environment. He does not say that his observations are a result of some sort of experiment, so I am willing to accept them as speculations and move on.

Human Nature and Christianity

It seems to me that after reading Book One, Bacon gives his readers a fairly-definite view of human nature. Looking at the goal of science, we see that Bacon says: "I who make such frequent mention of works and refer everything to that end" (117). It seems clear that the goal of science is to produce works and that the goal of works is to increase humanities powers and abilites over nature: The true and lawful discovery goal of the sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers" (81) or "My purpose is to... extend more widely the limits, of the power and greatness in man" (116). Aside from this evidence we can see that Bacon thinks nature in the hands of man natuarally leads to growth and progress as if this is the type of thing that should happen with humans. In aphorism 74 Bacon says that what is founded on the womb of nature will continue to grow and draw nourishment from nature. This can be oddly contrasted to his bug illustrations (which I am using to prove a point far different than what Bacon intended with them). In aphorim 95 Bacon talks about ants, bees, and spiders all doing different types of work. If one thinks about these animals, however, it is curious to note that all the work of these animals and pretty much all animals is work of subsistance. Ants, bees, and spiders all do work to build shelters and feed themselves, but not much more. Humans, on the other hand, have the task of constantly expanding their own powers. This is different than the other animals. The place that Bacon gets this from is his Christianity. In the last pragraph of aphorism 129 he says that man should recover his "right over nature, which belongs to it by divine bequest, and let power be given to [the human race], the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion". This clears up (and simultaneously causes problems for) Bacon's view of human nature. God gave nature to man for man to rule over. Despite, all the Bible-verses Bacon uses to testify to his ideas it seems that one could bring up plenty of counter-examples. The two that come to mind are the Tower of Babel and the story of Cain and Abel. In the Tower of Babel humanity is punished for working together to make a name for themselves by reaching heaven in a tower. It seems to me that producing scientific works in which god's power in nature is subverted so that the greatness of humanity be extended is a parallel situation. Similarly in cain and Abel, Cain is punished by God for sacrificing his left overs after he had taken the best for himself. Again, Bacon's goal of science as making greater man's powers seems prallel to Cain. Bacon does not talk much of glorifying God with his reults only of uplifting man. If these things are true (and christianity only provides the appearance of a justification for the conquest of nature) then questions later asked by Nietzsche about why man wants power over things become much more relevant, as does any physchological/philosophical explanation of man's desire for power.

Aphorism 1: Off to a Difficult Start

For quick reference, here is the aphorism:

"Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything."

My initial goal is to dissect this exactly. Then to raise potential problems that I could not find the answers to later.

First, Bacon seems to assume a purpose to man's (human's) existence. This is apparently drawn from the only capacity that man has for understanding; observation of nature. As such, the purpose of man's reasoning ability is to do the only thing it is capable of. That is the capability to understand nature. One can immediately raise the question of why. Why is man only capable of understanding nature? In fact, can't man understand phenomena better then nature? I think the response that Bacon would give would definatly include the arguement that the more practical knowledge that one would gain from nature would be preferable and more usable. From this could he conclude that the usable is primary in our task? If so the nature of philosophy in general is under question. The purpose to discover the empirical truth seems secondary to what is immediatly most practical; is this not the opposite goal to what Bacon intends? I thought his goal was to describe another method of understanding that would clarify problems with past methods. I am more confused by making a large jump to observations being primary than I am concerned by the use of the knowledge gained by phenomenology. I would claim that one cannot know any of nature truely, but one can use the assumptions that understanding nature brings more than one can use the more exact study of phenomenology.