The Other Succession Problem

According to Hobbes, the nature of the social covenant is such that “every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man [i.e., the Sovereign]… on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner” (II.xvii.13). Yet the power of the Sovereign extends beyond the time the covenant was made. I was not consulted when the founding fathers drafted the constitution, but I am still bound by it. Just as the members of the commonwealth grant sovereignty to the monarch’s successors, so too do they give up the rights of their own successors. How is this justified?

Hobbes’ response is interesting. It seems that Hobbes could simply say that, once born into a commonwealth, it would be even more irrational to return to a state of war when the commonwealth is clearly more powerful than you, a mere individual. But he doesn’t.

Hobbes argues that newborns enter the social contract by consent. The mere fact that children are generated by two parents is not enough. If this were all that was needed, both parents would have absolute power over the child because both parents contribute equally to the generative act. This is a contradiction, for the sovereign will must be one will: “no man can obey two masters” (II.xx.)

The child consents to the rule of a single sovereign—through the mother, because she has the most direct control over the child in a state of nature. The father is added on only by the mother’s consent (and thus, by extension the child). This is not the same as before, because by consensually sharing power the mother and father form one sovereign will, not two.

The child consents because he has no other choice. The mother nourishes the child on condition that the child, as part of her dominion, accept the absolute sovereignty of the commonwealth. Rationality dictates that he accept her terms, because without this nourishment the child cannot live, or will likely not live very long: “Preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him” (II.xx.5). Finally, rationality also dictates that, as part of the social contract, the parents set forth these terms; otherwise the commonwealth would be too weak. In this way the sovereign and the subjects both have "an artificial eternity of life" (II.xix.14), allowing the commonwealth to continue indefinitely.

A Linguistic Argument against Free Will

In this post, I am going to explore Hobbes’s philosophy of language and an interesting implication it has in the “free will” debate.

What kinds of truth are we allowed to communicate with language? “When two names are joined together in a consequence or affirmation (as thus, a man is a living creature…), if the latter name, living creature, signify all that the former name, man, signifieth, then the affirmation or consequence is true; otherwise false” (I.iv.11). One paragraph later, Hobbes defines “truth” as “the right ordering of names in our affirmations” and claims that all one has to do to find it is “remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly” (I.iv.12). So the quest for truth consists in drawing out the consequences of definitions.

If we take this account seriously, it does strange things for everyday truths. Take, for example, the claim that “Peter owns a Lexus.” According to Hobbes, in order for this to be true, there must be something in the definition of “Peter” that signifies all that “owning a Lexus” signifies. But what in the definition of “Peter” includes this? It cannot be anything he shares with anyone else—e.g., his humanity, his maleness, his age, etc. We might say that something about Peter, say, the fact that he possesses the title and registration for a vehicle manufactured by a certain kind of company encompasses “owning a Lexus,” but this merely shifts the problem to a new level. What in the definition of Peter encompasses “possessing title and registration for such-and-such a car”?

The “owning a Lexus” can be present only in Peter’s singular individuality—“owning a Lexus” is bound up not in the universals we may predicate of Peter, but in the definition of Peter as being Peter and not Paul, Mary, or Sergius. But this means that any facts about Peter have to be part of his definition—and thus there is no Peter above and beyond Peter’s circumstances and actions.

Thus we have yet another reason “free will” is “without meaning” and “absurd” (I.v.5). A believer in free will may believe that “I did x, but I could have done y.” But for Hobbes, x is part of my definition; that which is included in the concept of “me” by definition signifies not-y.