Sunday, March 14, 2010
Rationality vs Human Nature.
Not only is there a problem with the monarch's desires, there is also a problem with desires of the subjects (aside from peace atm). I believe it is human nature to seek power and do whatever is rational to get that power. Hobbes might agree but not to the point where we would both say that this desire to seek power will overcome the rationality between the monarch/subject relationship. Even though the subjects are perfectly capable of understanding the rationality of obeying law, they do it only because of consequences rather than because its rational. If this is true, Hobbes account is wrong. Thoughts? If I were a subject, the only reason I would obey the law is to prevent any bad consequences. Otherwise, I would follow my human desire to rise above.
Sunday, March 7, 2010
America's Sovereign
Thursday, March 4, 2010
The Other Succession Problem
According to Hobbes, the nature of the social covenant is such that “every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man [i.e., the Sovereign]… on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner” (II.xvii.13). Yet the power of the Sovereign extends beyond the time the covenant was made. I was not consulted when the founding fathers drafted the constitution, but I am still bound by it. Just as the members of the commonwealth grant sovereignty to the monarch’s successors, so too do they give up the rights of their own successors. How is this justified?
Hobbes’ response is interesting. It seems that Hobbes could simply say that, once born into a commonwealth, it would be even more irrational to return to a state of war when the commonwealth is clearly more powerful than you, a mere individual. But he doesn’t.
Hobbes argues that newborns enter the social contract by consent. The mere fact that children are generated by two parents is not enough. If this were all that was needed, both parents would have absolute power over the child because both parents contribute equally to the generative act. This is a contradiction, for the sovereign will must be one will: “no man can obey two masters” (II.xx.)
The child consents to the rule of a single sovereign—through the mother, because she has the most direct control over the child in a state of nature. The father is added on only by the mother’s consent (and thus, by extension the child). This is not the same as before, because by consensually sharing power the mother and father form one sovereign will, not two.
The child consents because he has no other choice. The mother nourishes the child on condition that the child, as part of her dominion, accept the absolute sovereignty of the commonwealth. Rationality dictates that he accept her terms, because without this nourishment the child cannot live, or will likely not live very long: “Preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him” (II.xx.5). Finally, rationality also dictates that, as part of the social contract, the parents set forth these terms; otherwise the commonwealth would be too weak. In this way the sovereign and the subjects both have "an artificial eternity of life" (II.xix.14), allowing the commonwealth to continue indefinitely.
The Preservation of Life
Instituted Common Wealth: Hypothetical Situation
Though Hobbes' approach to these grand problems of human nature and law is very direct and rational, it seems to me that he makes an absurd fundamental statement in the Leviathan. In Chapter 18, he claims that in an Instituted Common Wealth, all men must agree to support the actions of the Common Wealth so that they might live peaceably with one another. Fair enough. He mentions the third consequence of this covenant is that even a man who opposes the Instituted Sovereign must consent to the Sovereign's power, regardless of the fact that he may have not voted or supported the institution in its formation. If the dissenter refuses to submit, Hobbes' answer is that he will be left in a state of war where any man can kill him/abuse him with impunity. This is where I have a problem.
Essentially, this dissenter, who may oppose the Sovereign on very rational grounds, is forced into a covenant with the Sovereign. (To get around this problem, Hobbes, in Chapter 20, allows that Common Wealths created out of fear/force are as equally valid as voluntary covenants.) Let us suppose that in this prior 'state of war' this dissenting man is non-aggressive and has the resources and ability to provide himself with better protection than the Sovereign is capable of providing him. Perhaps this man has accumulated material wealth and loyal friends and lives in a fairly remote area, essentially removing any threat of death. Let us say this man is living in a way where he no longer has to concern himself with the dangers of the 'state of war'.
However, this new Common Wealth is instituted about his home. When he refuses to surrender his will to the Sovereign on the grounds that he was perfectly capable of providing his own security, this peaceful dissenter is made an 'enemy of the state', rendering the safety and security he was able to provide to himself now inadequate against the Leviathan that intends to rob him of it. The Leviathan can have this peaceful man arrested or he can put a price on his head simply because he declines the protection of the Sovereign and does not wish to abandon his home to escape the Sovereign's borders.
I imagine Hobbes has some answer to this query of mine. He would probably argue that it's impossible for a man outside a Common Wealth to transcend this 'state of war'. However, I am not convinced that it is impossible to amass means of personal protection outside of the Common Wealth. Thoughts?
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Monarchy and Succession
Monday, March 1, 2010
Calvin and Hobbes: The Covenantal Debate

Repeatedly throughout The Leviathan, Hobbes has quietly, though straightforwardly, posited his opposition to the notions of the Reformation. Time and again he has called to mind the actions of the Presbyterians and independents and has attributed to them, in part, the disruption of the perfection of the commonwealth. Moreover, in his discussion of covenants, Hobbes remarks, in no uncertain terms, “to make covenant with God is impossible” except “by mediation of somebody that representeth God’s person” (85, 111). Likewise, he says, “this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie […] that is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition” (85, 111). In reading these passages I could not help but be reminded of the social and religious setting of Hobbes’ work and the subsequent waves he created through his attacks on the reformers. It is true that for a people whose faith was dependent upon the idea that God’s covenantal interaction with humanity serves as the primary means through which salvation comes and out of which they derive the authority to interpret the Scriptures, Hobbes’ claim for the impossibility of a Godly covenant would have been a heresy equal to that of the Papal indulgence.
All the same, though Hobbes’ claims would have come as offensive to the greater Reformed movement, his proclamations against the “vile and unmanly disposition” of the covenanter appear directed at an individual; namely, John Calvin. Calvin, a central figure of the Presbyterian movement, became famous for his writings and outspoken discourses on the doctrines of election and of God’s covenant with man. Undoubtedly, Calvin held to the notion that God’s interaction with man rested entirely God’s own hands. Thus, for Calvin, the covenants God makes with man are not only entirely possible, they are, by nature of God’s sovereignty, in no need of a mediator (as is true in the case of Abraham). Hence, whereas Hobbes’ saw a covenant with God as telling of a weakness unfit for the commonwealth, Calvin saw it as essential to obtaining peace in the human condition. Whereas Hobbes promotes an absolute monarchy, Calvin calls his followers back to an Abrahamic theocracy wherein God is the sovereign and humankind is the subject. What would Hobbes then say, believing God/Man covenants are impossible, if presented with this notion of a theocracy? How would Calvin respond to Hobbes’ notion of the all out war of everyone against everyone? And how would Hobbes respond if we pointed out his blatant misinterpretation of the Samuel passage presented in Chapter 20? I don’t know. But it’s worth considering further.