Humean Epistemology

"When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance." [5: 23]

I accept Hume's argument that the child is not led to this conclusion by any process of reasoning. I also accept that human understanding rests on some principle when it asserts the existence of cause and effect. But in the particular case of a man who would claim that every time there is a flame there is also hotness is a matter of fact, it seems presumptuous, or at least just as fallible, to say that his claim is false. Just as it is logically possible that at some moment in the future a flame may produce coldness (flame-man's claim falsified), it is also logically possible that at some moment in the future flame will be demonstrated to always produce hotness (flame-man's claim verified). So Hume cannot rule out the possibility that the hypothesis, every time there is a flame there is also hotness, is a true belief and thus future knowledge. And I don't think that he does rule it out, since he categorizes it as belief. But it is clear to me now that he has avoided a commitment to a metaphysical position. By being metaphysically irresolute, Hume can simply point out the elusive "governing principle of our actions" and in that way bring the reader closer to his views without any metaphysical baggage.

A Better Question.

Whether or not the smaller details of Rousseau's account of human nature are trivial. Any objection to his arguments can be found on a lower level. One must consider the very base of Rousseau's argument which undoubtedly that of human nature. He argues that our nature is to do away with what he considers to be unnatural desires and to focus on the equalities that come naturally. By supporting this view, one must necessarily consider human nature to be that which does not actualize our rational potential. This is backwards. Rather than emphasizing the gap between society and human nature, we must close that gap. It is human nature to reach towards rationality and therefor society. I'm assuming that there is no such thing as a society without rationality based on the fact that any willing exchange of goods/services MUST be a rational one. Of course there can be irrational exchanges but if so, I would not call that a society.) Once that debate has been settled, we can begin to ask ourselves whether or not Rousseau's unnatural inequalities are necessary when we do aspire towards actualizing humans rational potential; a question I find much more worthwhile.

Personal thoughts - It's funny how I think Hobbes and Locke overestimated human rationality but I think Rousseau's account greatly underestimates that rationality. Is there a median philosopher?

Rousseau: Taking Pragmatic Action

How are we to take Rousseau in an age where reverting back to his ideals, back to a true state of nature, would be impossible without a massive, global reduction in population? Do we remain in society and attempt to produce a change? Or, do we reject all of civilization and camp out in a remote South American forest?

Though Rousseau was writing in a time in which most of the world had been claimed as some entity's property (thereby establishing civil society in all corners of the earth, p.161), there were still some remaining wild lands. However, we can be certain he knew these places would not remain in a state of nature for much longer. It seems that, with this knowledge, he would write something more than a speculative history of the social and political structures of human beings. I would like to think he offers some kind of guidance, a suggestion of pragmatic action, amidst the hell of civilization. I haven't found it though.

Perhaps Rousseau would suggest that we drop all of our "surrogate activities," or tasks that hold no meaning to the savage man? Perhaps we try to eradicate all appearances and falsities from our own personal existence and consume ourselves with the activities that the savage man would participate in? Of course, in modern society, with legal and social restrictions, such steps towards a state of nature are all too easily thwarted.

No matter how good this supposed state of nature is, what is its ultimate value for us, modern/civilized people, without at least having an option to take some step back towards it?

The Distinction Between Society and Nature

I would like to bring attention to one of Rousseau’s most important presuppositions: that there is a radical distinction between nature and society. This distinction is evident from the first paragraph of the Preface, when Rousseau talks of man “as Nature formed him” and the need “to disentangle what he owes to his own stock from what circumstances and his progress have added to or changed in his primitive state” (P.1). The state of nature is some sort of default state, and the changes added by society are accidental changes to the nature of man.

I contend that this is a problematic assumption. Rousseau’s stated goal is “knowing men themselves” (P.1). This means the task set before us is to separate nature and nurture, to separate the essence of man apart from the conditioning arising from his environment. To use a modern analogy, if man were a robot, we are trying to understand his programming. Now, man is a very sophisticated robot, a robot that has the ability to change its own programming to adapt to various situations. In order to get at the original programming, we must find some way of abstracting away the various inputs that change its code.

If we say, with Rousseau, that man is capable of being conditioned, I see no reason for privileging the state of nature as man’s default state. The state of nature, too, provides inputs that man will absorb, causing him to change his programming. Admittedly, the input provided by society is more complex, but the man in Rousseau’s state of nature is only “natural” in the sense that he is not in society. Rousseau’s natural man is only an appearance, not a man-in-himself. Assuming Rousseau’s account is right, we have learned only how man would appear after exposure to a certain kind of environment, but we have not learned what the unconditioned man is like. Even if we were to grant that society is the only force that conditions man, we now have simply sidestepped the question and have made no attempt to understand the part of our nature that allows for such conditioning—the most important part. Either way, the absence of conditions is itself just another external state of affairs.

The antinomy that concerns us is not nature versus society, but man versus nature (here in the sense of that man's environment). In this sense, society and nature are not even distinct. Man is presented with a world; man faces nature. Society is merely a force of nature, acting in that environment.

How Do We Proceed, Rousseau?

Rousseau has been a fascinating read, and clear proof that an elegant style of writing can lend a great deal of perceived credibility to its author. As an added layer of security, Rousseau is quick to point out that he is only speaking "conjectures" (pg. 132, Exordium), and is not referencing supernatural revelation or the opinions of any underdeveloped sciences (Part 1, Paragraph 1). In a word, these thoughts are based on Rousseau's observations of man in Society (probably where he was living) and in more Savage states (the oft referenced Caribs), and stretch back in time by means of Philosophy to man in his original State of Nature: alone, simple-minded, able-bodied, and untroubled.

Rousseau is the first of the philosophers we have read that has depicted pre-Society man in any sort of favorable terms, and it calls ethical systems such as Aristotle's directly into question. How can we maintain that theoria is man's highest aim if he has no need of such a complicated activity in his original State? Are the intellectual virtues just man's coping mechanisms for life in Society, where appearance takes such a large role? Even if we were to try to reject the exercise of our intellectual capacities, could we even be successful in our attempt to return back to our original, simple State?

Undoubtedly, no. The complications and influence of society on our body and mind are practically inescapable at this point. We must find some way to live with our "overdeveloped" intellectual capacities. As Rousseau points out, we never develop any capacity unnecessarily, so there must be some way to make use of this extra faculty. To try and neglect it will surely lead to a feeling of discontent and unease. Even in light of our Savage nature, we must embrace our biggest defect: our intellect. We may never be able to live in the State of Nature, but we can make the best of our Society-adjusted selves by doing what Savage man did naturally: to exercise our capacities as they are naturally suited to us, and to avoid unnecessary desires.

The Phenomenon of Free-Will in Rousseau's “Savage Man”

“His modest needs are so ready to hand*... (par 21)” The savage's knowledge consists only of the means by which he can accommodate his 'modest needs.' They are 'ready to hand' in that he need not deliberate about the means of accommodation, it is already known. The savage, when hungry, looks for deer. He has knowledge of deer, how to find it, and how to kill it. He need not 'think' about how he is to perform this task- he knows how to. It is the instinctive response to his passion.

The difference between savage and animal is the 'optional' nature of the passion: his free will. To act on his hunger presents itself as and option which he may obey or disobey “...and he is so far from the degree of knowledge necessary to acquire greater knowledge, that he can have neither foresight nor curiosity.” The savage has the knowledge of how to find and kill the animal already; he need not come up with a plan or strategy. He has found food many times in the same way. His free-will is his ability to deliberate between the two passions.

When I go to my refrigerator for a glass of water, I do not need to deliberate how to carry out my action (as long as I remember there is water in my refrigerator). My passions tell me that I am thirsty and I can either choose to continue typing or go get a glass of water.** My deliberation is only in-between my thirst and my laziness to get up. If I go and return without something disturbing the process, I can preform the whole task without even paying attention or thinking about it (as long as there is water in my refrigerator and the cups are where I think they are, etc.) I have performed this task many times. Likewise for the savage, “[t]he spectacle of Nature becomes so familiar to him that he becomes indifferent to it. Forever the same order, forever the same revolutions...”

Let us then turn to the following passage: “His soul, which nothing stirs, yields itself to the sole sentiment of its present existence, with no idea of the future, however near it may be, and his projects, as limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of his day.” Let us suppose that Paul wakes up in the morning tired and wants to remain in bed. He remembers, however, that he has to make a tent today in order to buy this week's groceries. Paul is now faced with two options; however, he is now deliberating between a current passion and a possible future passion. He knows that he will encounter the future passion because of his past.

Let us now imagine Paul deliberating about whether he should go to the supermarket now or make a tent and go to the supermarket later. In this case, he is not deliberating about the future passions (he knows he will be possibly be hungry without deliberation) but is deliberating about the most efficient way to accommodate them. When the passions then arrive, he need not deliberate about them, unless they are strong enough to throw him off schedule. He eats breakfast at eight, lunch at noon, and dinner at six.

The savage's means of accommodation is already 'known,' he only deliberates with the passions themselves. The means of accommodation is a 'regularity'- in the same way that Paul need not deliberate the fact that he will, at some point, be hungry the savage need not deliberate that he can do such-and-such to accommodate his hunger. Paul's past informs him of the passions themselves- their order, regularities, revolutions, etc- and in this mode of 'foresight,' he plans out each day, as well as planning for tomorrow, the week, the month, and the year in terms of what he might possibly have to deal with. It is also of importance that in 'foreseeing' Paul ultimately sees his inevitable death- “one of man's first acquisitions on moving away from the animal condition (par. 19).

In summary, savage man deliberates between his immediate passions but not how his passions are to be accommodated, as he has foreseen this already. The civilized man, to the contrary, does not deliberate between his passions which he has foreseen already; he rather deliberates about the best means to accommodate these passions with respect to time.

*I think the translator might have stolen this phrase from someone...

**By the way, I actually did wait until I finished typing this to go get a drink of water. I don't know what that says about my autonomy, though.

Jean-Jacques, I'm confused.

I shall begin this post by saying that I like Rousseau. What he has to say feels like a breath of fresh air after reading Hobbes and Locke, and his account appears to be more accurate. Allergy season and all - I like Nature, and the idea that going back to humanity's supposed roots requires a Savage does not seem out of line. But I am still unable to satisfactorily reconcile Rousseau's account of what human beings have become with what they ought to be, or with what I consider to be an inextricable necessity for considering a human being qua human being: intellectual capacity.

In order to separate a human from an animal, the human must have rationality above and beyond said animal. (Cases of retardation and other such mental handicaps set aside.) My first point of confusion is what it is that originally separates the Savage as a human from an animal. This becomes less of a problem when we move onto the Savage's golden age, but it seems fuzzy in the Savage's original state. (See beginning of Part II §2, where Rousseau seems to use animal and man nigh interchangeably. Contrast with §6, when man learns to conserve and reproduce fire. This seems to begin his political appropriation.)

This leads into my second and biggest point of confusion and concern. Human beings have declined when they live outside themselves (in or through society) (§57). Going hand in hand with the development and sustainment of society is the development of human's mental faculties. This development is seen in the formation of language (however that happened), complex communities, and private property. Human beings go wrong, then, when they overdevelop their rational faculty. But this seems to suggest that when a human being becomes most a human being (by developing that which makes him so), he has become a bad human being (by [over] developing that which makes him so?).

Maybe I'm missing something. When reflecting on civil man's physical weakness, I am reminded of what Mr. Davis drew on the board Monday. Savage man's mental and physical capacities were equal. Contemporary man's mental capacity far outweighs his physical fitness, and this is a problem for Rousseau. But the advancement of mental capacity seems like the unavoidable end point of humanity as such. I understand how overdeveloping ones potential to gain weight is bad, as is overdeveloping one's potential to be muscular - they must be done in proper proportion to everything else. What I do not understand is why mental capacity's proper proportionality is capped, when - as the necessary human quality - it naturally develops into a great and powerful thing.

Help?