"When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance." [5: 23]
I accept Hume's argument that the child is not led to this conclusion by any process of reasoning. I also accept that human understanding rests on some principle when it asserts the existence of cause and effect. But in the particular case of a man who would claim that every time there is a flame there is also hotness is a matter of fact, it seems presumptuous, or at least just as fallible, to say that his claim is false. Just as it is logically possible that at some moment in the future a flame may produce coldness (flame-man's claim falsified), it is also logically possible that at some moment in the future flame will be demonstrated to always produce hotness (flame-man's claim verified). So Hume cannot rule out the possibility that the hypothesis, every time there is a flame there is also hotness, is a true belief and thus future knowledge. And I don't think that he does rule it out, since he categorizes it as belief. But it is clear to me now that he has avoided a commitment to a metaphysical position. By being metaphysically irresolute, Hume can simply point out the elusive "governing principle of our actions" and in that way bring the reader closer to his views without any metaphysical baggage.
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Hume may reject the very possibility of the hypothesis guaranteeing us that a flame will also be hot in the future because we have no access to the 'secret powers' that cause the flame to be hot in the first place, only the experience of it being hot all the time. Therefore I think Hume would say that it is impossible to demonstrate that a flame will always produce hotness because of his account of epistemology.
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