Rousseau explains that the difference between man and animal is that man acts by freedom. He chooses, while the animal acts by instinct. It is nature which guides the animal’s actions. This capacity to choose freely may become detrimental to man if he gives into desires excessively. For example, he may weaken himself by becoming fat. This of course is part of the bastardization of the domesticated man. But only a civil man can abuse this faculty—that is, a man outside the state of nature and inside a civil society. The savage can’t abuse his freedom. He would never desire to. He is only concerned with those things directly related to his subsistence. In a sense, he is naturally temperate. Such a virtue as temperance becomes something to be attained after a man becomes civil.
In short, once man becomes civil, he has the freedom to choose to give into his excesses, a choice that never crosses the mind of the savage. The civil man becomes susceptible to excessive indulgence. This is to say that only the civil man has the choice to become decadent. Aristotle’s ethics thus becomes necessary for the civil man—that is, the subjugation of the body to the mind becomes necessary. But only because the civil man's mind has been freed to think of things higher than himself. The savage has no need for Aristotle. His mind is not capable of thinking abstractly and thus need not aspire to become wise. In short, there are no intellectual virtues for the savage. But what about practical wisdom? Does the savage not need to be able to deliberate well about the things that relate to everyday living in order to live in the state of nature? Yes, he does. But such a virtue need not be attained by the savage. It is natural to him. The need to attain virtues only arises once man becomes civil. Aristotle is only necessary to the weak, (compared to the savage), civil man who desires to know.
I think that makes sense. It seems in one sense that philosophy is the result of degeneraion in man. Plato seesm to think that Solon didn't need philosophy because he already lived the good life, just like Confucious says that the ancients naturally lived by the Dao and didn't need to discuss it. There is another sense though in which philosophy frees our minds to pursue higher things which, as you said, did not even cross the savages mind. Whether this is truly an advancement or a sort of epiphenomenon of our degenerate need for philosophy is the real question (to my mind at least).
ReplyDeleteI had hoped this question would arise. It seems as though philosophy could be the by-product of the civil man's weakness. Perhaps he needs it to survive as a weaker being. At the very least, the civil man must overcome his passions and desires to avoid the decadence he is susceptible to, which involves the subjugation of body to mind. Is this a sign of weakness? Yes, compared to the savage, at least. But it's necessary for the civil man.
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ReplyDeleteIf we accept that this savage man is in someway virtuous, how do we reconcile Aristotle's claim that contemplation is the highest end for man? If Aristotle means contemplation is the highest end for civil man, then I believe enough has been said already about how philosophy (and contemplation) comes about out of man's decadence. But I wonder if Aristotle only means civil man. I've always read it as though contemplation is the highest end, for man in general. It seems that civil man has a much more difficult time being prudent or well-tempered, but is it possible that if he can master those virtues of character that he can rise far above what a savage man could be?
ReplyDeleteEven if contemplation is the highest end for man (civil and savage), philosophy can still be the result of man's decadence. Something of worth can result from man's fight against decadence. Perhaps even a discovery of divine objects of knowledge and the way to know them can be the result. But still, even if contemplation is the highest end for man, if philosophy is the result of man's freedom to become decadent, then it is of no use for the savage. It can't be of any use for the savage, for he isn't able to rise above himself. The moment he does, he is no longer the savage at hand. Yet the savage at hand is still, I think, naturally virtuous. He has not the freedom that makes Aristotle necessary. Thus, he has no need for him.
ReplyDeleteI'm just not sure I'm comfortable calling him virtuous. We could call him temperate, moderate, or prudent, but I think he lacks an essential part of what Aristotle considers to be a virtuous man, that is, the formulation and practice of the intellectual virtues. I feel like the intellectual virtues are inextricably tied up in the virtuous man, and that if a man lacked them it would be a mistake to call him virtuous.
ReplyDeleteWe could call him temperate (a virtue for Aristotle), moderate (also a virtue), or prudent (a virtue).
ReplyDeleteYet you say he is not virtous: Would you say that a man needs to have all the virtues to be virtuous, then? For certainly the political man described by Aristotle, lacking wisdom but possessing the intellectual virtue of practical judgment, is still, in a sense, virtuous, right? If he doesn't lack the title of ‘virtuous’ because he doesn't possess all the virtues, I see no reason to exclude the savage from his title as well.
Or we could say you are right that the savage can’t be virtuous if he doesn’t possess intellectual virtues. But then again, by your own reasoning, we will be forced to say that you are mistaken: what you call prudence, Aristotle calls practical judgment or practical wisdom (and in some translations the word prudence), and to these he predicates the title of Intellectual Virtue. It turns out, then, that even according to you, our Savage is virtuous.
You're right. If we say a savage has prudence, we must admit that he has at least a small measure of the intellectual virtues. I guess the question really lies in whether or not a man is virtuous if he does not practice all the virtues, which I am tempted to answer "No, he is not virtuous, just on the way to becoming virtuous."
ReplyDeleteYou are forgetting a fundamental distinction between the civil man and the savage: Their abilities are different. The civil man’s function is held to a higher standard because he possesses the ability to reason in such a way that allows for the higher arts. His function is the activity of the soul in accordance with reason or not without reason. What follows for the possession of eudaimonia is the superior part of the soul in accordance with the most superior virtue that engages the highest object of knowledge. The savage, however, is incacapable of such things. Thus the most virtuous thing he can do qua savage is to be prudent or practically wise. This virtue, due to his calm passions, natural vigor, and instinctual skills, is possessed by virtue of being a savage at all. Thus our savage is performing his highest function the best way he is capable of—and even more, he does it naturally. A virtuous table is one that stands sturdy, has a flat surface and smooth edges, and is capable of supporting this computer and the fish bowl next to it. The savage, like the table, is doing all he can do and doing it well.
ReplyDeleteI keep trying to think of ways to express my belief that the savage man and the civil man are still both fundamentally Man, and that they would still have the same end, but it may be the case that this point does not matter. Time seperates savage man from civil man, but insofar as savage man is historically prior to civil man, it seems to be true that he is living virtuously, for him, in the time period that he exists. Hah! Turns out you were right.
ReplyDeleteI just wonder whether or not the fact that savage man and civil man are the same animal matters. I can't really say either way, but I think there might be something worthwhile there.
In a sense, Derek, you may be right. We are speaking about the same animal, and the savage man did, after all, develop into the civil man. How the transition from the savage man to the civil man came about is actually beyond me, if the savage actually does lack the freedom Rousseau says he does. But the savage qua savage lacks this freedom nevertheless, and it is bound to it until released by... something. In this state he is other than civil man and so, I think, cannot be held to the standard of the civil man's virtues. But in a sense, as I said before, they are the same animal and one could say that the savage man has certain potentialities that aren't yet actualized and once they are he is held to the standard of the civil man's virtues. This seems to be a legitimate claim. It is the fact that the savage has not the control to do such a thing so easily that I believe renders him something other than the civil man, and so virtuous on a different account, despite his sharing the same species.
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