Humean Epistemology

"When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance." [5: 23]

I accept Hume's argument that the child is not led to this conclusion by any process of reasoning. I also accept that human understanding rests on some principle when it asserts the existence of cause and effect. But in the particular case of a man who would claim that every time there is a flame there is also hotness is a matter of fact, it seems presumptuous, or at least just as fallible, to say that his claim is false. Just as it is logically possible that at some moment in the future a flame may produce coldness (flame-man's claim falsified), it is also logically possible that at some moment in the future flame will be demonstrated to always produce hotness (flame-man's claim verified). So Hume cannot rule out the possibility that the hypothesis, every time there is a flame there is also hotness, is a true belief and thus future knowledge. And I don't think that he does rule it out, since he categorizes it as belief. But it is clear to me now that he has avoided a commitment to a metaphysical position. By being metaphysically irresolute, Hume can simply point out the elusive "governing principle of our actions" and in that way bring the reader closer to his views without any metaphysical baggage.

A Better Question.

Whether or not the smaller details of Rousseau's account of human nature are trivial. Any objection to his arguments can be found on a lower level. One must consider the very base of Rousseau's argument which undoubtedly that of human nature. He argues that our nature is to do away with what he considers to be unnatural desires and to focus on the equalities that come naturally. By supporting this view, one must necessarily consider human nature to be that which does not actualize our rational potential. This is backwards. Rather than emphasizing the gap between society and human nature, we must close that gap. It is human nature to reach towards rationality and therefor society. I'm assuming that there is no such thing as a society without rationality based on the fact that any willing exchange of goods/services MUST be a rational one. Of course there can be irrational exchanges but if so, I would not call that a society.) Once that debate has been settled, we can begin to ask ourselves whether or not Rousseau's unnatural inequalities are necessary when we do aspire towards actualizing humans rational potential; a question I find much more worthwhile.

Personal thoughts - It's funny how I think Hobbes and Locke overestimated human rationality but I think Rousseau's account greatly underestimates that rationality. Is there a median philosopher?

Rousseau: Taking Pragmatic Action

How are we to take Rousseau in an age where reverting back to his ideals, back to a true state of nature, would be impossible without a massive, global reduction in population? Do we remain in society and attempt to produce a change? Or, do we reject all of civilization and camp out in a remote South American forest?

Though Rousseau was writing in a time in which most of the world had been claimed as some entity's property (thereby establishing civil society in all corners of the earth, p.161), there were still some remaining wild lands. However, we can be certain he knew these places would not remain in a state of nature for much longer. It seems that, with this knowledge, he would write something more than a speculative history of the social and political structures of human beings. I would like to think he offers some kind of guidance, a suggestion of pragmatic action, amidst the hell of civilization. I haven't found it though.

Perhaps Rousseau would suggest that we drop all of our "surrogate activities," or tasks that hold no meaning to the savage man? Perhaps we try to eradicate all appearances and falsities from our own personal existence and consume ourselves with the activities that the savage man would participate in? Of course, in modern society, with legal and social restrictions, such steps towards a state of nature are all too easily thwarted.

No matter how good this supposed state of nature is, what is its ultimate value for us, modern/civilized people, without at least having an option to take some step back towards it?

The Distinction Between Society and Nature

I would like to bring attention to one of Rousseau’s most important presuppositions: that there is a radical distinction between nature and society. This distinction is evident from the first paragraph of the Preface, when Rousseau talks of man “as Nature formed him” and the need “to disentangle what he owes to his own stock from what circumstances and his progress have added to or changed in his primitive state” (P.1). The state of nature is some sort of default state, and the changes added by society are accidental changes to the nature of man.

I contend that this is a problematic assumption. Rousseau’s stated goal is “knowing men themselves” (P.1). This means the task set before us is to separate nature and nurture, to separate the essence of man apart from the conditioning arising from his environment. To use a modern analogy, if man were a robot, we are trying to understand his programming. Now, man is a very sophisticated robot, a robot that has the ability to change its own programming to adapt to various situations. In order to get at the original programming, we must find some way of abstracting away the various inputs that change its code.

If we say, with Rousseau, that man is capable of being conditioned, I see no reason for privileging the state of nature as man’s default state. The state of nature, too, provides inputs that man will absorb, causing him to change his programming. Admittedly, the input provided by society is more complex, but the man in Rousseau’s state of nature is only “natural” in the sense that he is not in society. Rousseau’s natural man is only an appearance, not a man-in-himself. Assuming Rousseau’s account is right, we have learned only how man would appear after exposure to a certain kind of environment, but we have not learned what the unconditioned man is like. Even if we were to grant that society is the only force that conditions man, we now have simply sidestepped the question and have made no attempt to understand the part of our nature that allows for such conditioning—the most important part. Either way, the absence of conditions is itself just another external state of affairs.

The antinomy that concerns us is not nature versus society, but man versus nature (here in the sense of that man's environment). In this sense, society and nature are not even distinct. Man is presented with a world; man faces nature. Society is merely a force of nature, acting in that environment.

How Do We Proceed, Rousseau?

Rousseau has been a fascinating read, and clear proof that an elegant style of writing can lend a great deal of perceived credibility to its author. As an added layer of security, Rousseau is quick to point out that he is only speaking "conjectures" (pg. 132, Exordium), and is not referencing supernatural revelation or the opinions of any underdeveloped sciences (Part 1, Paragraph 1). In a word, these thoughts are based on Rousseau's observations of man in Society (probably where he was living) and in more Savage states (the oft referenced Caribs), and stretch back in time by means of Philosophy to man in his original State of Nature: alone, simple-minded, able-bodied, and untroubled.

Rousseau is the first of the philosophers we have read that has depicted pre-Society man in any sort of favorable terms, and it calls ethical systems such as Aristotle's directly into question. How can we maintain that theoria is man's highest aim if he has no need of such a complicated activity in his original State? Are the intellectual virtues just man's coping mechanisms for life in Society, where appearance takes such a large role? Even if we were to try to reject the exercise of our intellectual capacities, could we even be successful in our attempt to return back to our original, simple State?

Undoubtedly, no. The complications and influence of society on our body and mind are practically inescapable at this point. We must find some way to live with our "overdeveloped" intellectual capacities. As Rousseau points out, we never develop any capacity unnecessarily, so there must be some way to make use of this extra faculty. To try and neglect it will surely lead to a feeling of discontent and unease. Even in light of our Savage nature, we must embrace our biggest defect: our intellect. We may never be able to live in the State of Nature, but we can make the best of our Society-adjusted selves by doing what Savage man did naturally: to exercise our capacities as they are naturally suited to us, and to avoid unnecessary desires.

The Phenomenon of Free-Will in Rousseau's “Savage Man”

“His modest needs are so ready to hand*... (par 21)” The savage's knowledge consists only of the means by which he can accommodate his 'modest needs.' They are 'ready to hand' in that he need not deliberate about the means of accommodation, it is already known. The savage, when hungry, looks for deer. He has knowledge of deer, how to find it, and how to kill it. He need not 'think' about how he is to perform this task- he knows how to. It is the instinctive response to his passion.

The difference between savage and animal is the 'optional' nature of the passion: his free will. To act on his hunger presents itself as and option which he may obey or disobey “...and he is so far from the degree of knowledge necessary to acquire greater knowledge, that he can have neither foresight nor curiosity.” The savage has the knowledge of how to find and kill the animal already; he need not come up with a plan or strategy. He has found food many times in the same way. His free-will is his ability to deliberate between the two passions.

When I go to my refrigerator for a glass of water, I do not need to deliberate how to carry out my action (as long as I remember there is water in my refrigerator). My passions tell me that I am thirsty and I can either choose to continue typing or go get a glass of water.** My deliberation is only in-between my thirst and my laziness to get up. If I go and return without something disturbing the process, I can preform the whole task without even paying attention or thinking about it (as long as there is water in my refrigerator and the cups are where I think they are, etc.) I have performed this task many times. Likewise for the savage, “[t]he spectacle of Nature becomes so familiar to him that he becomes indifferent to it. Forever the same order, forever the same revolutions...”

Let us then turn to the following passage: “His soul, which nothing stirs, yields itself to the sole sentiment of its present existence, with no idea of the future, however near it may be, and his projects, as limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of his day.” Let us suppose that Paul wakes up in the morning tired and wants to remain in bed. He remembers, however, that he has to make a tent today in order to buy this week's groceries. Paul is now faced with two options; however, he is now deliberating between a current passion and a possible future passion. He knows that he will encounter the future passion because of his past.

Let us now imagine Paul deliberating about whether he should go to the supermarket now or make a tent and go to the supermarket later. In this case, he is not deliberating about the future passions (he knows he will be possibly be hungry without deliberation) but is deliberating about the most efficient way to accommodate them. When the passions then arrive, he need not deliberate about them, unless they are strong enough to throw him off schedule. He eats breakfast at eight, lunch at noon, and dinner at six.

The savage's means of accommodation is already 'known,' he only deliberates with the passions themselves. The means of accommodation is a 'regularity'- in the same way that Paul need not deliberate the fact that he will, at some point, be hungry the savage need not deliberate that he can do such-and-such to accommodate his hunger. Paul's past informs him of the passions themselves- their order, regularities, revolutions, etc- and in this mode of 'foresight,' he plans out each day, as well as planning for tomorrow, the week, the month, and the year in terms of what he might possibly have to deal with. It is also of importance that in 'foreseeing' Paul ultimately sees his inevitable death- “one of man's first acquisitions on moving away from the animal condition (par. 19).

In summary, savage man deliberates between his immediate passions but not how his passions are to be accommodated, as he has foreseen this already. The civilized man, to the contrary, does not deliberate between his passions which he has foreseen already; he rather deliberates about the best means to accommodate these passions with respect to time.

*I think the translator might have stolen this phrase from someone...

**By the way, I actually did wait until I finished typing this to go get a drink of water. I don't know what that says about my autonomy, though.

Jean-Jacques, I'm confused.

I shall begin this post by saying that I like Rousseau. What he has to say feels like a breath of fresh air after reading Hobbes and Locke, and his account appears to be more accurate. Allergy season and all - I like Nature, and the idea that going back to humanity's supposed roots requires a Savage does not seem out of line. But I am still unable to satisfactorily reconcile Rousseau's account of what human beings have become with what they ought to be, or with what I consider to be an inextricable necessity for considering a human being qua human being: intellectual capacity.

In order to separate a human from an animal, the human must have rationality above and beyond said animal. (Cases of retardation and other such mental handicaps set aside.) My first point of confusion is what it is that originally separates the Savage as a human from an animal. This becomes less of a problem when we move onto the Savage's golden age, but it seems fuzzy in the Savage's original state. (See beginning of Part II §2, where Rousseau seems to use animal and man nigh interchangeably. Contrast with §6, when man learns to conserve and reproduce fire. This seems to begin his political appropriation.)

This leads into my second and biggest point of confusion and concern. Human beings have declined when they live outside themselves (in or through society) (§57). Going hand in hand with the development and sustainment of society is the development of human's mental faculties. This development is seen in the formation of language (however that happened), complex communities, and private property. Human beings go wrong, then, when they overdevelop their rational faculty. But this seems to suggest that when a human being becomes most a human being (by developing that which makes him so), he has become a bad human being (by [over] developing that which makes him so?).

Maybe I'm missing something. When reflecting on civil man's physical weakness, I am reminded of what Mr. Davis drew on the board Monday. Savage man's mental and physical capacities were equal. Contemporary man's mental capacity far outweighs his physical fitness, and this is a problem for Rousseau. But the advancement of mental capacity seems like the unavoidable end point of humanity as such. I understand how overdeveloping ones potential to gain weight is bad, as is overdeveloping one's potential to be muscular - they must be done in proper proportion to everything else. What I do not understand is why mental capacity's proper proportionality is capped, when - as the necessary human quality - it naturally develops into a great and powerful thing.

Help?

Unnatural Selection

A possible concern, or tremendous question, regarding Rousseau's Second Discourse on Inequality is found in the idea that natural man now occupies an unnatural state. How is it that the difference between the Savage man and the sociable man is so great that "what constitutes the supreme happiness of the one would reduce the other to despair?" (Pt. II P. 57). Considering Rousseau's obvious preference to the state of nature and distaste of modern man, we must certainly not regard modern man as more natural than the Savage. He, the sociable man, as someone who may "live only in the opinions of others" does so to the detriment of his nature, which is to "live within himself." These mutually exclusive qualities seem to deny us the possibility of defining the sociable man as natural, but then what are we left with- that is, how has nature produced something unnatural?

Unless we simply say that it is wholly 'natural' because nature is indifferent to the repugnance that causes us to call our present state unnatural, we are left in a tough position.

Earth: Worthless Materials or Natural Fertility?

When reading Locke, what most struck me was his (what I consider) irreverent (and incorrect) conception of Nature and the Earth. Locke says that the earth is furnished with "only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves" [43]. I completely fail to understand Locke's interpretation of what the Earth naturally has to offer - after all, our ancestors lived off the earth's naturals resources for quite some time, and all the animals still do.

Rousseau holds a position entirely opposite of Locke. He says the earth is entirely sufficient for man, "abandoned to its natural fertility, and covered by immense forests which no Axe ever mutilated, at every step offers Storage an shelter to the animals of every species" [3].

What is the root cause of the divergence between these two accounts? Taking a look at both Locke and Rousseau's account of the state of nature may help shed some light on the matter.

Locke says that the state of nature is comprised of the states of liberty and equality [4], with the law of nature (reason) governing it [6]. This means that man is in a state of relative peace and that he defends the liberty of everyone equally. He is bound to preserve himself, and along with himself, the rest of mankind.

Rousseau's account of the state of nature is not as rigid and textbook as that of Locke (or Hobbes). Nature is, well, nature, and if we imagine mankind in a rain forest never having come into contact with civil society - we are on the right track. This results in man being timid and fearful: "forever trembling, and ready to flee at the least noise that strikes him, and at the least movement he notices [6]. No mention of hostile Hobbesean attacks on his neighbors, nor any mention of reason as an integral part of the Savage world. He is almost solely concerned with self-preservation against an unsure (and possibly language-less) world.

So far both accounts seem to be very similar. But the split happens before either system gets completely off the ground, for we can see in Locke's very conception of the state of nature that we are not conceiving of savages, but with civil men like ourselves. The law of nature, reason, seems not to be a cold, calculating reason found in animals (or in Rousseau's Savages), but an advanced way of reasoning that pre-civil man should not possess. Of course the earth is useless for civilians, for we are not used to going naked or being without habitation, not to mention using our own two hands to hunt and fight off predators.

Rousseau's account of pre-civil man is more accurate, for assuming that this man is more like the animals, he lives in the open and takes part of a rugged lifestyle, making the earth in its natural form perfectly fitted for his use. Rousseau warns against the error that Locke made: "Let us therefore beware of confusing Savage man with the men we have before our eyes" [11]. This is Locke's fatal mistake in his characterization of the earth and what it has to offer, and stems from the misconception of savage man he formed in the beginning.

The State of Nature and War for Locke

Locke's description of the state of nature of man differs from Hobbes in that it is not necessarily a state of war. Locke distinguished between the two by designating the state of nature as that community of "men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth," and the state of war as "the declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief." [Ch. 3 P. 19] Locke avoids an inevitable state of war by defining reason as "that law which teaches all mankind that no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." [Ch. 2 P. 6] Everyone is obliged to follow reason in the state of nature, and therefore the state of war only emerges when an offender "declares himself to live by another rule than that or reason" by harming another, but not necessarily, because the first state of humanity is one of peace under the right rule of reason. [Ch. 2 P. 8]

So then, how does the state of war appear at all? Locke avoids the supposition that all uncivilized communities will probably be in a state of war by explaining that "it is impossible for any man to entrench upon the right of another, or acquire, to himself, a property, to the prejudice of his neighbor, who would still have room, for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated." [Ch. 5 P. 36] This so-called 'Land of Plenty' eliminates any reason for one person to by force take something from another. The only possible explanation given by Locke for why someone would exert force on another is found briefly in paragraph 37 of Ch. 5, where he says "the desire of having more than men needed altered the intrinsic value of things." Therefore someone suffering under excessive desire would, against reason, employ force against another to obtain more than needed, and thereby enter into a state of war with that person. This is expressly against reason because reason would dictate first that one should never harm another, and second that resources are plentiful and can always be obtained by one's own labor, yet in both instances the desire overrules reason. It seems then that the state of war is due to a heedless observance of reason in that which we desire, and desire is the "other rule" that offenders live by.

The Virtuous Savage

Yea, yea, I'm double posting. But an idea occured to me when reading Rousseau that I felt I should share. Admittedly, I have only read half of part 1 of the Discourse on Inequailty so far, so this may be premature. However, what follows seems fairly straightforward.

Rousseau explains that the difference between man and animal is that man acts by freedom. He chooses, while the animal acts by instinct. It is nature which guides the animal’s actions. This capacity to choose freely may become detrimental to man if he gives into desires excessively. For example, he may weaken himself by becoming fat. This of course is part of the bastardization of the domesticated man. But only a civil man can abuse this faculty—that is, a man outside the state of nature and inside a civil society. The savage can’t abuse his freedom. He would never desire to. He is only concerned with those things directly related to his subsistence. In a sense, he is naturally temperate. Such a virtue as temperance becomes something to be attained after a man becomes civil.

In short, once man becomes civil, he has the freedom to choose to give into his excesses, a choice that never crosses the mind of the savage. The civil man becomes susceptible to excessive indulgence. This is to say that only the civil man has the choice to become decadent. Aristotle’s ethics thus becomes necessary for the civil man—that is, the subjugation of the body to the mind becomes necessary. But only because the civil man's mind has been freed to think of things higher than himself. The savage has no need for Aristotle. His mind is not capable of thinking abstractly and thus need not aspire to become wise. In short, there are no intellectual virtues for the savage. But what about practical wisdom? Does the savage not need to be able to deliberate well about the things that relate to everyday living in order to live in the state of nature? Yes, he does. But such a virtue need not be attained by the savage. It is natural to him. The need to attain virtues only arises once man becomes civil. Aristotle is only necessary to the weak, (compared to the savage), civil man who desires to know.

The rotten apple: a crime against man or God?

In Ch. V, Locke says that God gave the earth and its goods to mankind in common to rely on for their subsistence. The only natural property a man has is his body. But if man is going to take advantage of the goods God gave him, there must be a way for him to appropriate some personal property. A man can claim something as his own if he puts the labor into acquiring or producing it. He need not the consent of others to claim his property, for it is the natural right of man to reap what he sows.

Because God has supplied mankind with plenty more than need be, man can acquire as much as he can use without it spoiling. If a man acquires too much and it spoils, however, he has surpassed his rights as an individual man and thereby committed a trespass against the rest of mankind. For this, he is liable to punishment. But why?

Is there any rational basis for such punishment? The reason Locke gives is that it is only rational to take what you need: why waste something if you’re not going to use it? It may seem that it is only rational to do take only as much as you need, but this need not imply that it would actually be irrational to take more than you need, even if it spoils. The reason Locke says the man has committed a trespass against the rest of mankind is that he has taken from them. But has he? Has not God supplied man with plenty more than mankind could ever need? It doesn’t seem that letting the fruit spoil actually does harm anyone at all. Why didn’t Locke say that there actually were a limited number of resources. This would make punishing a “trespasser against mankind” legitimate. But he can’t say such a thing, for 1^st Timothy tells us that “God has given us all things richly”(pg. 290). But now that we are speaking of the earth as a gift from God, things change. It is not that man actually trespasses mankind, it is that he is being disrespectful to God when he spoils that which God has given him. It seems as though that the ‘evil’ of the spoiler isn’t due to his trespass against mankind, but rather to his irreverence.

Hobbes and Locke as Political Scientists

After reading portions of Hobbes and Locke, I would like to compare them as Political Scientists. It seems that using scientist-ness as our criterion in comparing these two philosophers leaves Hobbes as the clear winner. When reading Hobbes, one gets the sense that he paid no attention to Aristotle's caveat,which says, of men no science can be made. Hobbes tries to account for every variable in a political society and address it as best he can. You can see this in the structure of his book: he starts by telling us that a political society is a fake human, and that that the city is composed of humans. in other words he says that the material and (kind of) formal cause of a city is a "human". Thus, in his four part book, he spends the entire first part looking at what man is. He describes the passions, the desires, and actions of men in lengthy detail so that we may better understand the components of a political entity. He even does so in a geometric/axiomatic manner (as much as possible). Even though axioms are based on opinions to some extent, Hobbes tries to base his opinions on observation and experience, and he then proceeds in a nearly deductive manner.
Locke, on the other hand, uses opinions and scripture as the basis for his political theory at nearly every turn. Where Hobbes is telling us to beware sentimentality, Locke is discussing the heritage of Adam. Where Hobbes is explaining what a human being is, Locke is telling us why we ought to read the Judicious Hooker and Sir Robert Filmore which are merely more opinions of the day.
Overall, it seems that hobbes gives us a more straightforward account of what a human is, how they behave, why they enter into a society, and ultimately why we should have an absolute monarchy. It is important to note, however, that all of these things follow from what a human is. In Locke it seems that one could disagree on many grounds like the system he is setting up is not just, or people wouldn't behave in the way he predicts. Yet for Hobbes, precisely because he has defined all of these things, the only argument you can have with him, is an argument about definitions.

Rebellion or Assimilation: Hobbes, Locke, and Freedom in the Commonwealth

Just as with Hobbes’ Leviathan, Locke’s Second Treatise on Government is entirely concerned with the notions of freedom and preservation. And although differing in their opinions of the purpose and need for absolute power and monarchy, i.e. the way people interact with one another and formulate commonwealths, Hobbes and Locke agree, in principal, that a man’s first and most basic instinct is that of survival. What’s more, this survival or freedom to survive seems to be the principle means by which Locke defines his State of War. As he notes in Chapter III, “He who attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power, does thereby put himself into a State of War with him” (279). Moreover, “No body can desire to have me in his Absolute Power, unless it be to compel me by force to that, which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my Preservation” (279). Essentially, Locke is arguing that, as he states later on, the State of War is created when one man imposes “Force, without Right, upon another Man’s person” (281). Locke, thus, continually associates the notion of the State of War with the State of Slavery. And whereas Hobbes would consider an enslaved commonwealth rightfully conquered and assimilated not only lawful but justified, I’m not sure Locke would agree. After all, for Hobbes, free will does not exist, but for Locke, free will is the cornerstone of his entire political philosophy. All the same, for both men, the principle Laws of Nature pertain to the idea of survival and the freedom to survive, even if they disagree about the best method for obtaining that survival.

Nevertheless, as we noted in class on Monday, Locke’s arguments are entirely unsatisfying. Beyond the fact that he doesn’t give us a sufficient definition and qualification of the factors contributing to a State of War as Dr. Davis pointed out, even when he does attempt to quantify his arguments, he does so in vague terms. As stated above, he defines the State of War as “Force, without Right, upon another Man’s person,” but what equates Right? Would Locke argue that there is a just and right cause for the oppression of another man’s freedoms? I hardly believe it. Altogether, Locke’s ideas fail to follow a simple and explanatory process of logical progression.

Rationality vs Human Nature.

I will agree with Hobbes by the fact that a monarchy is the best kind of rule only if he considers that monarchy to be in what most of us would call a perfect world. His ideal common wealth and government grossly underestimate human greed and desires to the point that its obvious there is so such perfect world where his system would work. Human desires will undoubtedly overcome the very rationality that Hobbes bases his theory on. It is suggested that the monarch will always do what is best for the people because it is the people who willingly keep him in power. This is rational to the point that it will never happen. His goal is only to keep the people happy in so far as they do not revolt. Even though Hobbes will object, it has nothing to do with keeping peace for the peoples sake. The monarchs desire is not to keep the people happy for their sake - he does it for his own sake. This will create animosity of the subjects.
Not only is there a problem with the monarch's desires, there is also a problem with desires of the subjects (aside from peace atm). I believe it is human nature to seek power and do whatever is rational to get that power. Hobbes might agree but not to the point where we would both say that this desire to seek power will overcome the rationality between the monarch/subject relationship. Even though the subjects are perfectly capable of understanding the rationality of obeying law, they do it only because of consequences rather than because its rational. If this is true, Hobbes account is wrong. Thoughts? If I were a subject, the only reason I would obey the law is to prevent any bad consequences. Otherwise, I would follow my human desire to rise above.

America's Sovereign

In class we have discussed who or what America’s sovereign in Hobbes’ terms is, on multiple occasions, without a real definitive result. I’d like to further study that in this blog post, and am interested in hearing your thoughts as well. The first office most of us assumed to be the sovereign was the president. However, he does not have absolute power, because both Congress and the Supreme Court have the power to veto or overrule the president. Others thought maybe the Constitution was the sovereign. Yet this is also lacking absolute sovereignty, because it is possible to amend the Constitution. Also, Congress does not have absolute power because both the president and the Supreme Court can overrule or veto. Further, the House of Representatives can veto the Senate and vice versa, so at times there is not even a consensus within Congress in itself. Perhaps sovereignty ultimately lies with the American people. I do not think Hobbes would like this answer. As subjects of the Commonwealth, the American people must follow the laws and rules of the Commonwealth, an obligation that the sovereign is not subject to. My first thoughts on this lead me to believe that America’s sovereign was actually the Supreme Court, but not even they could be considered the sovereign. The Supreme Court has the final say on judicial matters that cannot be overridden by Congress or the president, but that is as far as their power extends. The judges have no power in legislative or executive branches of the government, nor do they choose their successors. In the end, it appears to me that America has no absolute sovereign, at least not within the government. Anyone have any thoughts as to who or what our nation’s sovereign might be?

The Other Succession Problem

According to Hobbes, the nature of the social covenant is such that “every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man [i.e., the Sovereign]… on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner” (II.xvii.13). Yet the power of the Sovereign extends beyond the time the covenant was made. I was not consulted when the founding fathers drafted the constitution, but I am still bound by it. Just as the members of the commonwealth grant sovereignty to the monarch’s successors, so too do they give up the rights of their own successors. How is this justified?

Hobbes’ response is interesting. It seems that Hobbes could simply say that, once born into a commonwealth, it would be even more irrational to return to a state of war when the commonwealth is clearly more powerful than you, a mere individual. But he doesn’t.

Hobbes argues that newborns enter the social contract by consent. The mere fact that children are generated by two parents is not enough. If this were all that was needed, both parents would have absolute power over the child because both parents contribute equally to the generative act. This is a contradiction, for the sovereign will must be one will: “no man can obey two masters” (II.xx.)

The child consents to the rule of a single sovereign—through the mother, because she has the most direct control over the child in a state of nature. The father is added on only by the mother’s consent (and thus, by extension the child). This is not the same as before, because by consensually sharing power the mother and father form one sovereign will, not two.

The child consents because he has no other choice. The mother nourishes the child on condition that the child, as part of her dominion, accept the absolute sovereignty of the commonwealth. Rationality dictates that he accept her terms, because without this nourishment the child cannot live, or will likely not live very long: “Preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him” (II.xx.5). Finally, rationality also dictates that, as part of the social contract, the parents set forth these terms; otherwise the commonwealth would be too weak. In this way the sovereign and the subjects both have "an artificial eternity of life" (II.xix.14), allowing the commonwealth to continue indefinitely.

The Preservation of Life

Hobbes' Commonwealth stands so long as the principle aim of a human is taken to be the continuation of life. Some objections have been raised in class that ultimately bring alternative purposes of human life into question, and if one is to confront Hobbes it would be on the basis of this primal purpose. If one accepts for instance that the adherence to a specific belief is higher in importance than one's own life, then consent to a Commonwealth could be revoked rationally. The Commonwealth is built around the mutual consent to surrender some of our natural rights in order to better secure our life, which comes first in the order of our interests. As for as the continuation of life is concerned, Hobbes does indeed set forth a bulletproof protocol. Actions are unreasonable for Hobbes because the defy the preservation of life, yet as soon as an action is accompanied by an additional value that supersedes human life one may adopt it, even within the certainty of death, to no danger of lunacy. A new question then arises concerning the existence of any value that may trump the preservation of life in importance.

Instituted Common Wealth: Hypothetical Situation

Though Hobbes' approach to these grand problems of human nature and law is very direct and rational, it seems to me that he makes an absurd fundamental statement in the Leviathan. In Chapter 18, he claims that in an Instituted Common Wealth, all men must agree to support the actions of the Common Wealth so that they might live peaceably with one another. Fair enough. He mentions the third consequence of this covenant is that even a man who opposes the Instituted Sovereign must consent to the Sovereign's power, regardless of the fact that he may have not voted or supported the institution in its formation. If the dissenter refuses to submit, Hobbes' answer is that he will be left in a state of war where any man can kill him/abuse him with impunity. This is where I have a problem.

Essentially, this dissenter, who may oppose the Sovereign on very rational grounds, is forced into a covenant with the Sovereign. (To get around this problem, Hobbes, in Chapter 20, allows that Common Wealths created out of fear/force are as equally valid as voluntary covenants.) Let us suppose that in this prior 'state of war' this dissenting man is non-aggressive and has the resources and ability to provide himself with better protection than the Sovereign is capable of providing him. Perhaps this man has accumulated material wealth and loyal friends and lives in a fairly remote area, essentially removing any threat of death. Let us say this man is living in a way where he no longer has to concern himself with the dangers of the 'state of war'.

However, this new Common Wealth is instituted about his home. When he refuses to surrender his will to the Sovereign on the grounds that he was perfectly capable of providing his own security, this peaceful dissenter is made an 'enemy of the state', rendering the safety and security he was able to provide to himself now inadequate against the Leviathan that intends to rob him of it. The Leviathan can have this peaceful man arrested or he can put a price on his head simply because he declines the protection of the Sovereign and does not wish to abandon his home to escape the Sovereign's borders.

I imagine Hobbes has some answer to this query of mine. He would probably argue that it's impossible for a man outside a Common Wealth to transcend this 'state of war'. However, I am not convinced that it is impossible to amass means of personal protection outside of the Common Wealth. Thoughts?

Monarchy and Succession

(This is really a restatement of a point I made in class, but I would like to elaborate and elucidate upon my initial thoughts)

Hobbes makes some very convincing arguments for why a monarchy is the most effective form of government to maintain the commonwealth. However, A potential weakness of monarchies that Hobbes himself notes in Chap. xix is the area of "succession". In a monarchy, if the sovereign and his designated successors are killed, exiled, or otherwise removed from the state, then the state "returns to confusion and to the condition of a war". Furthermore, if it is unclear which successor the monarch has chose, the same confusion may occur. The concentration of power, which gives the monarchy many of it's strength, may also be the root of one of its greatest weaknesses.

In contrast, governments which are assemblies are much more difficult to destroy; by nature they cannot fail "unless the multitude that are to be governed fail". This hints that they may be more robust governments in the aspect of succession.

However, Hobbes might respond by claiming that the strengths of a monarchy outweigh this weakness, and that the various weaknesses of assemblies are greater than this resiliency. Also, Hobbes spends much of the end of Chap. xix emphasizing the importance of a good succession system, and so he might claim that a monarchy with a strong system for succession is a realistic goal and that succession is therefore a weakness that can be avoided. Maybe...

Calvin and Hobbes: The Covenantal Debate

Repeatedly throughout The Leviathan, Hobbes has quietly, though straightforwardly, posited his opposition to the notions of the Reformation. Time and again he has called to mind the actions of the Presbyterians and independents and has attributed to them, in part, the disruption of the perfection of the commonwealth. Moreover, in his discussion of covenants, Hobbes remarks, in no uncertain terms, “to make covenant with God is impossible” except “by mediation of somebody that representeth God’s person” (85, 111). Likewise, he says, “this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie […] that is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition” (85, 111). In reading these passages I could not help but be reminded of the social and religious setting of Hobbes’ work and the subsequent waves he created through his attacks on the reformers. It is true that for a people whose faith was dependent upon the idea that God’s covenantal interaction with humanity serves as the primary means through which salvation comes and out of which they derive the authority to interpret the Scriptures, Hobbes’ claim for the impossibility of a Godly covenant would have been a heresy equal to that of the Papal indulgence.

All the same, though Hobbes’ claims would have come as offensive to the greater Reformed movement, his proclamations against the “vile and unmanly disposition” of the covenanter appear directed at an individual; namely, John Calvin. Calvin, a central figure of the Presbyterian movement, became famous for his writings and outspoken discourses on the doctrines of election and of God’s covenant with man. Undoubtedly, Calvin held to the notion that God’s interaction with man rested entirely God’s own hands. Thus, for Calvin, the covenants God makes with man are not only entirely possible, they are, by nature of God’s sovereignty, in no need of a mediator (as is true in the case of Abraham). Hence, whereas Hobbes’ saw a covenant with God as telling of a weakness unfit for the commonwealth, Calvin saw it as essential to obtaining peace in the human condition. Whereas Hobbes promotes an absolute monarchy, Calvin calls his followers back to an Abrahamic theocracy wherein God is the sovereign and humankind is the subject. What would Hobbes then say, believing God/Man covenants are impossible, if presented with this notion of a theocracy? How would Calvin respond to Hobbes’ notion of the all out war of everyone against everyone? And how would Hobbes respond if we pointed out his blatant misinterpretation of the Samuel passage presented in Chapter 20? I don’t know. But it’s worth considering further.