Hume begins section 5 with a praise of Academic Skepticism. He says that it is an honest philosophy, which is less likely to fall to the passions of the mind—those passions that lead one to premature dogmatic conclusions. The height of Hume’s praise is embodied in the following sentence: “Every passion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; and that passion never is, nor can be, carried to too high a degree.”
Despite their love for truth, though, the Skeptics have received hatred. It is precisely their love for truth that causes this, for the skeptics are quick to expose the hasty judgments of other philosophical systems.
The Academic skeptics, instead of reaching dogmatic conclusions, choose rather to suspend their judgment on uncertain matters. In short, they suspend belief. With proper consideration, such a suspension of belief seems to be problematic for rational animals. How, if they are to suspend belief, are the skeptics to function? For example, would a true skeptic not question his belief that a car was moving toward him and thus get it by it? This is a question of the coherence of the skeptic: If the skeptic truly suspends belief, he would not be able to function. The skeptic does function. Thus, the skeptic doesn’t truly suspend belief.
Realizing that this problem would arise to the reader, Hume addresses it. He explains that such skepticism doesn’t interfere with those governing principles nature has endowed us with. If a car is moving toward the skeptic, he will move because it appears that he will be hit. This is natural to him. It is natural to him, and thus he acts. If one asked the skeptic why he moved, he would reply that it appeared that the car was going to hit him. If asked why such a thought made him move, he would reply that based on experience, it was reasonable for him to do so. If asked by what reasoning he made this step, he would say he doesn’t know or know if it was reasoning at all, but it’s worth discussing.
This discussion is where Hume begins. It is important to understand the foregoing explanation of skepticism, for if one becomes incredulous because such skepticism seems impractical and contrary to experience, he not only has misunderstood the reason for Hume’s enquiry, but is likely to exclude himself from the possibility of seeing truth in the skeptics claim, if indeed they are true.
I found this post very helpful. But I suspect that Hume's elaboration of the skeptic is unique.
ReplyDeleteCompare, for example, Descartes' Discourse. Descartes skepticism is supposedly so complete that he must have rules for living to guide him in daily life. He seems to fear that skepticism might render hims unable to act and so comes up with a list of rules before doubting. I think Mr. Smith could show that Descartes misunderstands the scope and outcome of skepticism. Mr. Smith's skeptic does not require a list of such rules since he simply responds to situations immediately based on experience.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I wonder what we do about laws. One of the main things D. emphasizes is that he will follow the law. Law following seems based on reason not experience (at least in some cases).
Since one doesn't choose to follow the laws of nature, but is rather 'forced,' I am assuming you're speaking of the laws of society.
ReplyDeleteAgain, following the laws, just like moving out of the way when a car comes, considering past experiences, seems like the reasonable thing to do. The skeptic, I think, would follow the laws because based on experience it seems he must if he wishes to remain free any sort of punishment. Whether or not the skeptic believes in the authority of the government or the legitimacy of the laws, I think, would be a topic he would be willing to discuss.
Hume, we must remember, isn't an ancient skeptic. He recognizes the skeptics claims, identifies with them, but thinks (I think) that there can be progress made based on experience. This is to say that if Hume were to discuss the laws of society, he would attempt to describe them based on experience and reason, without attempting to surpass the limits of the understanding. He would, based on experience, observe the causal relationships between humans and, without attempting to draw metaphysical conclusions (he thinks that the moralists are excused in their search for general principles in mankind), make a judgment about the laws of society.
As soon as I saw the words 'academic skepticism' I thought "this must be Mr. Smith's post."
ReplyDeleteA correction may be made here. Although Hume does refer to the skepticism he is praising as Academical or Skeptical philosophy, I am not quite sure he means ancient Academic Skepticism and not Pyrrhonian skepticism. His account in this section and in later sections of the book seem to be of a Pyrrhonian nature rather than an Academic one.
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