Descartes discovers God, and with this discovery he finds that his existence is dependent on God's existence. Furthermore, he comes to find that he is absolutely certain of God's existence; in fact, he can "know nothing more evident or more certain." He believes that because of this he sees a way in which he can come to possess knowledge of other things:
"To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God."
This is the basis of why he believes, by using his intellect properly, he can be absolutely certain concerning all sorts of things:
"Next I experience that there is in me a certain faculty of judgment, which, like everything else that is in me, I undoubtedly received from God. And since he does not wish to deceive me, he assuredly has not given me the sort of faculty with which I could ever make a mistake when I use it properly."
Descartes' conception of God is perfection: eternal, omniscient, omnipresent, infinitely good, all-powerful, etc. It is easy for people to agree upon a definition of eternal, omniscient, and omnipresent; but it may be more difficult for people to agree on exactly what infinite goodness is, especially as it relates to an all-powerful being. Most have heard the phrase "God doesn't do things because they're just; actions are just because God does them." Does Descartes think so? If not, does the presence of a legitimate opposing opinion (if it is legitimate) bring into question his "certainty" of God's nature?
Descartes seems to draw his conception of God's goodness from an all too human standpoint. He reduces God's goodness to his own (Descartes') conception of goodness. Many theologians have asserted these points, although here I will pose them as questions: What if, being all-powerful, God has orchestrated the world according to his own master plan? And what if deception is a part of this plan? What if God's deceiving doesn't call into question his goodness, for what man can subject God’s actions to his conception of goodness? Ultimately, if God is all-powerful, things are good because he does them; and our conception of goodness, which may, as Descartes' does, involve deeming deception malicious, may be far from accurate as a description of God.
If it does indeed turn out that it is not a certitude that God would not deceive, then Descartes cannot rely completely on his intellect, even if he uses it properly.
Sorry, the font was not that big in word.
ReplyDeleteI think another example of what you're exploring could be Plato's noble lie in the Republic. If someone is being deceived for the greater good, is it still attesting to maliciousness or weakness, as Mr. Smith has pointed out?
ReplyDeleteA very interesting issue. How does God's goodness guarantee truth for Descartes? What does goodness have to do with truth? Within the Meditations, the fate of the external world's reality seems to depend on this question.
ReplyDeleteKennington argues in his essay on the evil deceiver (in On Modern Origins) that the evil deceiver is finite and never brings mathematics into doubt (look at the list of things D. doubts b/c of the e.d.). This might mean that D. never imagines an all powerful deceiver or D.'s doubt is NOT universal. It concerns only sensation and the corporeal world sensation contacts.
This reading might allow one to side-step your question, Mr. Smith, since it depends on D.'s universal doubt and simply indicates he does not have a good enough reason to overcome it (i.e. there is no good enough reason to believe god's goodness = truth for finite humans). If, however, his doubt never ran so deep, he has not only God but also (though he doesn't say this b/c he wants to please the church?) mathematics as a standard or ground by which clarity and distinctness (thus truth) is guaranteed FROM THE BEGINNING. This brings new life to the points several of us have made concerning God's truth routinely being elucidated by geometrical examples.
Is math yet mightier than God for D.?