In Meditations, Descartes seems to be making the following "ontological" argument:
Df 1: Infinite substance is that which is eternal, immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myself and everything else (if anything else there be) (AT 45).
Df 2: [By inference] finite substance is any substance which is not infinite substance.
Axiom: If the objective reality of an idea does not exist in me, then solipsism is impossible (AT 42).
Ontological argument:
P1: I have the idea of finite and infinite substances.
P2: I am not eternal, immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and/or I did not create both myself and everything else (if anything else there be).
P3: By Df 1, I am not an infinite substance.
P4: By P3, the objective reality of the idea of infinite substance does not exist in me.
P5: By the Axiom, solipsism is impossible.
Also, a question: I am having problems with Descartes’ use of the word ‘substance;’ so far, it seems merely to mean ‘thing’ or ‘entity.’ Anyone found any interesting bits on this?
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The following is probably not much more than pedantry, but I think Descartes believes his ideas have full objective reality, and it is more that he does not possess the formal reality of the idea.
ReplyDelete@Mr. Lefavor: ideas seem to have more or less objective reality. the idea of a finite substance has less objective reality than the idea of infinite substance. No idea can have zero objective reality, but some can have more than others I think.
ReplyDelete@Mr. Bodayle: Substance seems to be approached here as the underlying substratum which bears properties or accidents. Substance may also be that on account of which something is said to be an independent thing.
I feel like I'm missing something in this post, perhaps because of the title.