Thought is.
vs.
I think; I exist.
Some of us are having trouble seeing how the latter could not be true, and some of us are having trouble seeing how the latter is a legitimate conclusion based on the first. I wanted to throw up a blog post so that we could all have a place to blog-comment our way to the truth.
Is the supposition that I am the "thing" (loosely speaking) that thinks unsubstantiated? Or can we merely conclude that there is thought? Why or why not?
For example:
A thought that came up in conversation after class: Perhaps the "I" and the "my" are superfluous. When I talk about "my" thoughts, I am really just talking about thoughts. When I talk about "your" thoughts, I'm not really talking about your thoughts, but a concept of mine that is a convenient representation of how your head works. Every thought is my thought; your thoughts, unable to be experienced, are not thoughts. Unfortunately, this brings us dangerously close to solipsism.
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If we revise the statement from "I think, therefore I am" to "There is thought," then it seems to me that the act of thinking would simply be thought recognizing itself, as mentioned in class. But if thought is able to recognize itself, then it is an entity of its own carrying out the action of recognition. So it seems to me that the statement would remain "I think, therefore I am" insofar as "I" represents the thought itself. "I think, therefore I am Thought."
ReplyDeleteI share Mr. Stabenfeldt's sentiments. If there is thought, does thought not think that it is thinking? I think so.
ReplyDeleteIf this is the case, then, just as Mr. Stabenfeldt has said, 'I' is 'Thought'.
If we say "I am Thought," though, that seems to carry the implication that there is no other thoughts than the ones we are experiencing.
ReplyDeleteEither way, "I" is a term of self-relation that is taken for granted rather than explicitly inquired into. Instead of asking how continuity in thought persists such that the reflexive "I" relation is possible, D. assumes the "I". Is this "I" is possible without memory? Since memory is not really part of the rational soul proper, it should be doubted as part of the imagination along with the corporeal world. Without memory, how can thought at T1 be related to thought at T2 such that both can be called I's thinking?
ReplyDeleteLong story short: D. doubts the external world, not the coherence or unity of the subject point of view. Hence, "I" sneaks past his examination. But it won't sneak past Kant's examination in the B deduction of the CPR.