Reductio ad absurdum

1) In the first paragraph of chapter VI, Hobbes notes that voluntary motion always depends upon a precedent thought of wither, which way, and what; the imagination is the “first internal beginning of all voluntary motion.”

2) Here, the question arises as to, if voluntary and vital motion are an excluded middle (which Hobbes distinguishes them to be: “There be in animals two sorts of motions particular to them...”), whether imagination (and/or “precedent thought of wither, which way, and what”) constitute voluntary or vital motion.

3) Should we read “internal” as meaning ‘internal to the concept of voluntary motion’ or ‘internal to the body?’

4) Vital motion is essentially distinguished from voluntary motion by the imagination (VI, 1); however, imagination itself is distinguished as a motion (II, 2).

5) Furthermore, Hobbes refers to this motion as “that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man.”

6)Then again, imagination is “the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion” (VI, 1), which on a second reading appears to be a certain ‘first aspect’ essentially belonging to voluntary motion.

7)A contrario, “voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of whither;” here “precedent” seems to portray a harbinger of voluntary motion which is itself essentially motional but not essential to the voluntary motion.

8) This also calls into question deliberation and willing- are they too this intermediate motion between vital and voluntary? Deliberation causally proceeds willing which itself is the cause of voluntary actions (VI, 53).

9) “A voluntary act is that which proceedeth from the will and no other.” “No other”- is this to include the will itself? It must, unless willing proceeds from itself ad infinitum.

10) It is impossible for the will to be itself a voluntary action because, by def., ‘a voluntary action must proceed from a will;’ therefore, any ‘willing’ which is itself not grounded in another ‘willing,’ by def., ceases to be a voluntary action- as do all wills posterior to it.

11) Because deliberation is itself essentially prior to willing, it is eo ipso not-voluntary.

12) Therefore, imagination, deliberation, and willing are, by the law of excluded middle, vital motions. Et sequitur, imagination, deliberation, and willing continue “without interruption through [an animal’s] whole life.” Viz. imagination, deliberation, and willing are essential, always active constituents of what Hobbes means by ‘life’ qua animals.

13) If these three motions are sequential, then they cannot be always active.

14) Willings seems to not be always active (I am not willing while deliberating and cannot be ‘willing to deliberate’).

15) Ergo, Willing cannot be, by def.., a vital motion.

16) Hobbes' excluded middle is a false dilemma.