Good and True

Are the good and the true the same for Hobbes? It seems (to me) that they must be, and, in fact, I cannot conceive of them actually being any different. The clearest example where the two are different is Nietzsche, who rejects truth all together while supposing that man can still achieve his height of existence through that which is good (will to power). The clearest example of the good and the true being the same is Plato, for knowing the Good (the Truth) is the supposed highest form of life.

For Hobbes, it is debatable whether the good and the true and the same. When speaking of the right of the sovereign to be the judge of doctrine and opinion, he says that when doctrine is aimed at peace it is necessarily true (xviii, 9). Wishing to keep his commonwealth in a peaceful state, a (good) sovereign will reasonably offer doctrine of peace. And this doctrine is true because it is in accord with the first natural law (xiv, 4). So far so good – the truth and the good are one and the same.

Next, I wonder if a sovereign can reasonably lie to his subjects. Suppose god is not real, but the sovereign lies and says he (god) is. This is plausible, for Hobbes gives an account of Gentiles doing this same sort of thing to keep their people in obedience and peace (xii, 20). It seems reasonable to say, then, that:

A) the sovereign lies and says God is real

B) it promotes peace (as I believe Hobbes thinks it does)

Therefore, C) this a true doctrine

Obviously, since the first premise is a lie, this cannot be true. But since Hobbes has already conceded that it is plausible for a leader to imprint a false belief concerning divine ordination in his subjects’ minds, it is at least possible that Hobbes’ beliefs concerning God are also false. Hobbes would never agree to this (of course the Bible is true!), but perhaps it should set off alarms concerning the rigor of Hobbes’ account of truth.

Hobbes and Humanity

As Dr. Davis has said in class if one is to find a fault with Hobbes it must be in his definition of the passions or his account of the soul (although he wouldn't admit the term). My problem with Hobbes is that his account of humanity is pathetic and makes humans look weak, which of course they can be. Hobbes says that the fundamental motivation in human life is fear. While fear is certainly a powerful aspect of human life I think Hobbes overestimates its value. The fearful picture that Hobbes paints of human beings is not even an animal one. Animals do not (seem to) live the fear driven lives that we supposedly live. Although it is true that they are in a state of war, they do not constantly look over their shoulders out of fear that they will be killed or attacked by members of their own species.

Hobbes says that we form societies so that we are not in a state of war, yet he admits that this state of war has never historically occurred. This should lead us to an initial suspicion. Is man not the type of creature that is naturally compelled to create societies because a society is man's natural habitat? It seems that man has more natural inclination towards good and productive things in him than Hobbes acknowledges. I think two concepts to examine are friendship and beauty. Friendship is something that Hobbes mentions a few times in Chapter 13 (sec. 7) and Ch. 14 (sec. 12) as something that exists but he never explains how it came to be. It seems that man can have friends just for the sake of friendship. It is true that if a friendship was harmful to man he would not be in the relationship but it is not merely a by-product of wanting something or wanting reputation. Man is the type of animal that enjoys and needs friends on an emotional level. Beauty is also a phenomenon that Hobbes never explains. It seems that no type of fear or negative passion can inspire the desire for beauty. Yet no human being would rather look out of their window at a decaying factory when they could have the view of a beautiful park with a lake and lush rolling meadows. It seems that Hobbes cannot (or at least does not) explain for this part of the soul which yearns for good things out of a positive desire and not a reactionary negative desire.

Repost: Hobbes and Metaphysics

Just as most others concerned with metaphysics, Thomas Aquinas believed that one must first study the natural world and the effects therein. From this one becomes aware of the necessity of First causes. Hence, one studies metaphysics.

Thomas Hobbes agrees with Aquinas, at least that one becomes aware of the necessity of first causes through the study of the natural world: “For he that from any effect seeth come to pass should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly into the pursuit of causes, shall come to this: that there must be one first mover, that is, a first and an eternal cause of all things…” (ch.xiii)

For one who deems the study of metaphysics absurd, he most certainly is aware of the necessity of something metaphysical. Of course, (and thank God!) he has scriptural revelation to solve such a mystery: “ there must be one first mover, that is, a first and an eternal cause of all things, which is that which mean by the name of God…”

He deems metaphysical talk a cause of absurd conclusions, yet he is perfectly aware of the necessity of a supersensible entity. Without scriptural revelation, where would Hobbes be? As it relates to metaphysics, he would, if he is to maintain his integrity, have to give the issue no thought whatsoever (albeit the case that he is aware that there must be something supersensible). He could not speak or think about it; for, to him, our words and thoughts relate only to the sensible world. Is this a fault of Hobbes’s? No. Hobbes sees it fit to rely solely on faith to provide the knowledge of the necessary first cause (whether this is legitimate or not may be another story). Although Hobbes does have some peculiar theological positions, the Christian is able to claim that faith alone is sufficient for him. This is the only other option than silence for Hobbes with respect to metaphysics.

(But couldn’t Hobbes end up somewhere like Aquinas? No. Hobbes’s restrictions on language and concepts prohibit the use of the Thomistic and Aristotelian inquiry.)

Lost Letter of Descartes Found

http://chronicle.com/article/Key-Letter-by-Descartes-Lost/64369/

Natural Law

In thinking about the question "Does natural law exist," I looked at what Hobbes had to say in the sections we've addressed so far about how to justify or prove to people that natural law does in fact exist. I have found myself unconvinced, at least as it relates to Hobbes, that it is the nature of humans to always protect their lives, as we discussed in class. From the impression I got, Hobbes seems to think that humans always act to best defend their basic existence. This cannot be true, because there are many times where people risk their lives. Does this nature of man to protect his life, instead, only work when humans are acting rationally? Humans do not necessarily always act rationally, for that matter. There are emotional connections occasionally unrelated to any sort of real rationality that cause us to make decisions. Hobbes says "all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves, and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to their ends" (Ch. XV, Par 4). Do they always though? For example, if (hypothetically..) I drink to the point of drunkenness, I will most likely continue to consume alcohol, and will at this point take other actions that are not necessarily beneficial to me. This could be argued against, on the other hand, by someone saying that since I am in an altered state of mind, I am not what Hobbes means by "men." So is there natural law? In the sense that Hobbes discusses, I am yet unconvinced.

No Way Out

After reflecting on our earlier discussion, I realized that even love is insufficient to overturn Hobbes' estimation of human selfishness. For if it were true that human nature had in it a propensity to love, or care for the needs of others, there is not one relationship that does not have some sort of benefit for the lover.

Starting at the least intense love, the love between friends, it is easy for Hobbes to say that there is no love at all; instead, the "love" of friendship is just a mutual enjoyment of protection. If we define friendship as between two equals, Hobbes has already ruled that out; those friends will quarrel over their shared object of desire. If we instead say that people who are unequal are friends, Hobbes has two ready objections. First, no two people are really very unequal in capabilities, so he could dismiss proposing that any two people are unequal in strength or wit in the first place. Second, those unequal in power will surely be incapable of loving each other. The feeble one only cares for the more powerful insomuch as some protection is provided. And the more powerful one would only care for the weaker one's willingness to do his bidding.

Even love in family is not pure. Hobbes could argue that a father only "loves" his son because he has ownership over him; having a son gives a father someone to have power over. A mother's love seems more difficult to overcome, but not impossible. Her child was actually part of her body; she does not love the son for his own sake, she loves him only because he once was a part of her.

So in the end, is there any way for relationships to be unselfish? If not, is that a problem, or does it just strike us as cold?

Reductio ad absurdum

1) In the first paragraph of chapter VI, Hobbes notes that voluntary motion always depends upon a precedent thought of wither, which way, and what; the imagination is the “first internal beginning of all voluntary motion.”

2) Here, the question arises as to, if voluntary and vital motion are an excluded middle (which Hobbes distinguishes them to be: “There be in animals two sorts of motions particular to them...”), whether imagination (and/or “precedent thought of wither, which way, and what”) constitute voluntary or vital motion.

3) Should we read “internal” as meaning ‘internal to the concept of voluntary motion’ or ‘internal to the body?’

4) Vital motion is essentially distinguished from voluntary motion by the imagination (VI, 1); however, imagination itself is distinguished as a motion (II, 2).

5) Furthermore, Hobbes refers to this motion as “that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man.”

6)Then again, imagination is “the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion” (VI, 1), which on a second reading appears to be a certain ‘first aspect’ essentially belonging to voluntary motion.

7)A contrario, “voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of whither;” here “precedent” seems to portray a harbinger of voluntary motion which is itself essentially motional but not essential to the voluntary motion.

8) This also calls into question deliberation and willing- are they too this intermediate motion between vital and voluntary? Deliberation causally proceeds willing which itself is the cause of voluntary actions (VI, 53).

9) “A voluntary act is that which proceedeth from the will and no other.” “No other”- is this to include the will itself? It must, unless willing proceeds from itself ad infinitum.

10) It is impossible for the will to be itself a voluntary action because, by def., ‘a voluntary action must proceed from a will;’ therefore, any ‘willing’ which is itself not grounded in another ‘willing,’ by def., ceases to be a voluntary action- as do all wills posterior to it.

11) Because deliberation is itself essentially prior to willing, it is eo ipso not-voluntary.

12) Therefore, imagination, deliberation, and willing are, by the law of excluded middle, vital motions. Et sequitur, imagination, deliberation, and willing continue “without interruption through [an animal’s] whole life.” Viz. imagination, deliberation, and willing are essential, always active constituents of what Hobbes means by ‘life’ qua animals.

13) If these three motions are sequential, then they cannot be always active.

14) Willings seems to not be always active (I am not willing while deliberating and cannot be ‘willing to deliberate’).

15) Ergo, Willing cannot be, by def.., a vital motion.

16) Hobbes' excluded middle is a false dilemma.

A Linguistic Argument against Free Will

In this post, I am going to explore Hobbes’s philosophy of language and an interesting implication it has in the “free will” debate.

What kinds of truth are we allowed to communicate with language? “When two names are joined together in a consequence or affirmation (as thus, a man is a living creature…), if the latter name, living creature, signify all that the former name, man, signifieth, then the affirmation or consequence is true; otherwise false” (I.iv.11). One paragraph later, Hobbes defines “truth” as “the right ordering of names in our affirmations” and claims that all one has to do to find it is “remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly” (I.iv.12). So the quest for truth consists in drawing out the consequences of definitions.

If we take this account seriously, it does strange things for everyday truths. Take, for example, the claim that “Peter owns a Lexus.” According to Hobbes, in order for this to be true, there must be something in the definition of “Peter” that signifies all that “owning a Lexus” signifies. But what in the definition of “Peter” includes this? It cannot be anything he shares with anyone else—e.g., his humanity, his maleness, his age, etc. We might say that something about Peter, say, the fact that he possesses the title and registration for a vehicle manufactured by a certain kind of company encompasses “owning a Lexus,” but this merely shifts the problem to a new level. What in the definition of Peter encompasses “possessing title and registration for such-and-such a car”?

The “owning a Lexus” can be present only in Peter’s singular individuality—“owning a Lexus” is bound up not in the universals we may predicate of Peter, but in the definition of Peter as being Peter and not Paul, Mary, or Sergius. But this means that any facts about Peter have to be part of his definition—and thus there is no Peter above and beyond Peter’s circumstances and actions.

Thus we have yet another reason “free will” is “without meaning” and “absurd” (I.v.5). A believer in free will may believe that “I did x, but I could have done y.” But for Hobbes, x is part of my definition; that which is included in the concept of “me” by definition signifies not-y.

Courage and Sacrifice

In the sixth chapter of Part One of Leviathan, Hobbes defines several emotions and commonly experienced passions. He begins with several basic definitions, such as appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. All of these are built from two basic motions, appetite and aversion. Hobbes defines aversion as a feeling “we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us or not” (vi.4). He goes on to define fear as “aversion with opinion of hurt from the object” (iv.16). Consequently, courage is “the same with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance” (iv.17). I find this definition of courage lacking. Such a limited definition of courage seems to leave out the possibilities of selfless courage or sacrifice, which is never addressed. Hobbes’ definition appears to be focused on the preservation of the individual, but not the group. If courage is simply attempting to avoid a potential harm through resistance, then sacrifice would be just the opposite. Surely sacrifice requires great courage, yet it is taking a hurt upon oneself in order to prevent others from experiencing that very same hurt. Hobbes’ definition would only be strengthened by a clearer explanation of self-preservation in comparison with altruism.

Hobbes: Moral Subjectivity

In Chapter 6, Hobbes states that man's desire and aversion may aim at either two things: good or evil. Good is the object of a man's desire and evil is the object of a man's hate/aversion. Early on in Leviathan, Hobbes is introducing moral subjectivity in the defining of his terms. I'm interested to see how this moral subjectivity will work in the foundation of his political philosophy. If men can perceive good and evil in radically different ways, all equally valid, how can there be an agreeable sovereign to whom all men can give their 'right to nature'? The law can certainly not be written in a way that will accommodate polarized conceptions of morality. Under Hobbes' definition of good and evil, there can't even be a medium or standard by which to legislate. Rather, good and evil are reduced to the erratic desires and aversions of men.

You can't have both, Hobbes!

Either pick geometry or pick human inability to conceive the infinite.

Throughout part 1 of Leviathan, Hobbes seeks to clarify his work by defining the elements of human nature. In doing so, he concludes that knowledge is broken down into two types. The simple type refers to, "knowledge of fact." This is anything that can be empirically verified. As Hobbes puts it, "nothing else but sense and memory." On the other side of knowledge, Hobbes postulates, "knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another." To further define the second type of knowledge, Hobbes uses an example that relates to geometry. The example he gives is, "if the figure shown be a circle, then any straight line through the center shall it into two equal parts." Whats troubling about this is that he goes on to define this as a science, particularly one that pertains to the philosopher. This is troubling because this seems like rationality to me, which is not a kind of knowledge. Hobbes' second type of knowledge can only be a working of or a faculty of the mind rather than a piece of knowledge that is given. In other words, I see this type of reason not as some sort of presented fact, but as process by which we use logic to assess the given situation. I take Hobbes' account of knowledge to be wrong in this case.
This also makes me think of mathematical proofs. If we try to prove the previous example, one will quickly come to the most basic axioms - facts that must be accepted as true even though they have no empirical grounds whatsoever (cant measure the two halves of the circle or even make a straight line or circle, etc...) Unless Hobbes gives a fuller account of knowledge by grounding these basic axioms, we might as well consider his proof of knowledge to be, "we know because we know." It sounds silly when put this way but, nonetheless, he has not sufficiently established the grounds upon which he can say we know things intellectually. One more thought - does the quote, "There is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite" interfere with his second type of knowledge? The consideration of geometry made me consider that. How would we have knowledge that the two sections, when divided by a straight line are equal. Either we cant assume that, or we have some conception of the infinite.

'Q', Hobbes, and Jargon

In Chapter VIII of Leviathan (A.T. 27), Hobbes reiterates his notion of absurdity as earlier defined in Chapter V. Here, discussing issues of discourse, Hobbes defines absurdity as “when men speak such words as, put together, have in them no significance at all, but are fallen upon by some through misunderstanding of the words they have received and repeat by rote” (Hobbes 46). After having discussed these matters in our Wednesday session, and finding myself enthralled by the questions raised on the subject of conscious discourse, i.e. if the observation of the common niceties of speech in greeting and casual conversation are, in fact, a conscious engagement, I was moved to undertake a little outside research. As such, I turned to my library whereupon I happened across a collection of lectures presented by Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch to the students of Cambridge University between the years of 1913 and 1914. Later, compiled and published under the title On the Art of Writing, Quiller-Couch’s observations on language and the utility of discourse have become guideposts for writers that are second to none.

Most relevant to our purposes is his interlude “On Jargon.” Therein, Q. (as many of his contemporaries referred to him) clarifies, in no uncertain terms, just what this jargon or, as Hobbes would have it, absurdity actually entails. He notes two main vices: “The first is that it uses circumlocution rather than short, straight speech. It says ‘In the case of John Jenkins deceased, the coffin’ rather than ‘John Jenkins’s coffin’: and its yay is not yay, neither is its nay nay: but its answer is in the affirmative or in the negative […]. The second vice is that it habitually chooses vague, woolly, abstract nouns rather than concrete ones.” For Q., then, and I think Hobbes would agree based on his definition, jargon or absurdity is not so much a product of unthought or unimagined discourse but of thoughtless speech and poorly constructed discourse.

Hence, I don’t believe this issue of conscious discourse is so much a matter of are we thinking when we say hello to a familiar face in the hall, to use Mr. Bodayle’s example; rather, I think it’s a matter of whether or not what we’re saying actually merits being said. Overall, it’s not a question of are we talking, it’s a question of if what we’re saying is actually worth the talking.

Language, Truth, and Essence

"For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things," writes Hobbes (AT 15). The use of language is facilitated by words with constrained meanings, which causes truth and falsehood to became attributes of language necessarily. This is why Hobbes insists on clarifying definitions, because the the first abuse of speech is in "wrong, or no definitions" which lead to "false and senseless tenets" (AT 15). Could our proclivity towards seeking truth and falsehood by nothing more than a excessive compulsion engendered by the nature of language itself?

Furthermore, Hobbes writes later that "Understanding is nothing else but conception caused by speech," meaning specifically that understanding is solely the comprehension of the correct meaning and signification of words used in speech. Is then our understanding limited to only those things expressible in language, and also only valuable in as much as it is practical? It seems that this is the case if truth and falsehood of speech and of our understanding depend not on anything in nature but are only fabrication of the mind.

Additionally, could the fact that language necessarily ascribes each object a specific word meant to encompass its fundamental quality be responsible for our desire to assign each object a universal essence or being?

Hobbes and God

The footnote on page 3, paragraph 1 of the introduction to Hobbes Leviathan claims the title Leviathan alludes to Job 41. This chapter describes the Leviathan as an immensely powerful creature uncontrollable but by God himself, for God himself created it. Yet in the previous sentence Hobbes names "art" the creator of the Leviathan. Is it possible that Hobbes views God as the principle cause of all things? This strikes me as strange for someone whose writings influenced so many materialists.
In paragraph 1 of chapter iv he claims that God gave speech to man. As we talked about in class on Monday, he most certainly could have presented a way in which man could have developed speech without divine intervention, yet he chooses to attribute this to God. This God-given language Adam possessed seems to be free of the empty words and "insignificant sounds" mentioned in paragraph 20 of chapter iv. What if man had perfect speech before the tower of Babel? Perfect speech being a language with words that were not symbols of what they referenced but actually the things themselves. With perfect speech man would have perfect understanding since "understanding [is] nothing else but conception caused by speech." Man, an imperfect being, in possession of a perfect speech and understanding results in man building a tower to heaven. What does God do then? He removes man's perfect speech and consequently his perfect understanding.

Metaphors and the Absurd

Hobbes in Chapter iv-v discusses "absurdities" in language, which are contradictions or improper usages of words that render them nonsense. The example of the round quadrangle is obvious, but his dismissal of metaphors is troubling. Hobbes' main gripe with metaphor is that it is constituted by words in "other sense than they are ordained for" (iv, 4). Therefore the phrase "heart of stone" is absurd to Hobbes because it neither refers to a real heart nor anything actually made of rock.

Does Hobbes not understand the ambiguity inherent in most symbolic forms of communication? He seems to not acknowledge the role of connotation in language. Connotation is what gives metaphor power and meaning, and so metaphor is not as simply absurd and meaningless as Hobbes suggests.

This doesn't answer the question of why metaphors are sometimes preferred, though. Some may be unnecessary and distracting, but I think other metaphors have the ability to capture nuance and can also serve as a symbolic umbrella for emotions or details that would be otherwise hard to describe. Hobbes might respond by claiming that these nuances and details could in fact be explained (perhaps longwindedly) and that metaphor is still imprecise. I am not sure this is true; perhaps some situations or thoughts are damaged by extensive explanation, and so metaphor is the closest possible approximation to the subject.

Also, what does Hobbes think about the role of art, if even the imprecision of metaphor is criticized?

Memory in the Meditations

Out of the many mental activities Descartes examines in his Meditations, memory is not discussed at length. He says it a weak and limited faculty (AT57), and he considers it to be a liar when he subjects his entire world to doubt in the Second Meditation. In addition, when he examines the reality of the corporeal world in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes relies on memory to assist him in his reconstruction of outside objects.

Memory is not purely intellectual substance, but neither is it classified as extending substance. Memory is not pure thought, but neither is it perception. What is it? Perhaps it is best to go back to the Sixth Meditations and first ask what memory does for Descartes. In examining the existence of the body and its relation to the mind, Descartes uses memory to supply his imagination with sense-perceptions to consider. He uses the imagination and perception to examine the causes of error and determine whether sense-perception can be trusted. Fair enough, as long as Descartes doubts memory back in the Second Meditation along with everything else, this move is legitimate.

BUT, in the Second Meditation, it is clear that Descartes relies on memory. With it, he defines bodies (AT 26), a "me" for thought to be separable from (AT 27), and he posits that imagination is something which really exists and is part of his thinking (AT 29). This last point is most troubling. One cannot have an imagination without memory - Descartes says so himself in the Sixth Meditation (AT 74). Technically, Descartes says that sense-perception cannot get into the imagination without memory, but what else imagination if not memories of experiences, i.e. sense-perceptions? Descartes says imagination is not intellectual substance (AT 78), so it at bottom relies on the corporeal world rather than thinking. we can now classify memory as reliant on extending substance, if not extending substance itself.

What does this do for Descartes? When he doubts everything, he says he doubts the information memory gives him, but he still uses imagination and confirms it is real. He declares there is only thought, he never doubts that which he uses to get him to this conclusion. This raises major concerns as to the sincerity and validity of what Descartes is doing. Memory is such a huge aid to thought, that we should maybe be reluctant to declare that Descartes completely overlooked it. At any rate, it is a glaring problem in the Meditations, and leaves us wondering what Descartes was really after.

"Thought" or "I Think"...

In the last comment on Mr. Lefvor's last post, Dr. Davis says that Descartes never examined the subjective point of view. I would like to disagree with this and state that because of the type of thought Descartes discovered, an "I" or subjective viewpoint is necessitated (although he should have talked about this or explicitly examined it). Let us first look at what Descrtes classifies as thinking, for my argument rests upon this. On (AT) page 28, in the Second Meditation, Descrtes says that I am a thinking thing which is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, unwilling, imagines, and seems to have sense perception. Although he has already posited an "I", his types of thinking would ultimately lead him to this same conclusion. For instance, seeming to have sensory perception necessitates that one has a viewpoint and certain types of abilities. If only thought existed the only type of perception that would seem possible would be a senseless one, or maybe one could say that he would have every sense perception which would amount to saying that his sense perceptions include senses he doesn't have, (like echo-location or other possible sense which have not evolved yet) and that we would have these sense perceptions from every possible view-point of an object. Clearly those are both absurd alternatives and it seems that sense perception necessitates a viewpoint. Similarly, that fact that this thought does not know everything implies either 1) that what he has is not all of thought, which means that there is more than just him, and this sounds like having a point of view on the whole from a part (view-point) or 2) that there is an unconscious part of thought that is not known by reflixive thought. If this is true then saying "thought exists" is a near meaningless statement because he doesn't really know what thought is or he only knows a part of what thought is.
Another less critical problem is that Descartes often refers to his "faculty of true judgement" (Meditation IV, AT 54-55). It is common-sensical that a faculy is something that needs to be used by another. If this is the case then there must be an I that uses the faculty. This is not a great argument but if Descartes had any stock in the meaning of faculty then it has some persuaviseness.
Although, I don't disagree that someone using Descartes' methods ought to qustion the "I", I think that Decartes reasonably deduces his "I" from his definition of thought. If one is to argue that Descartes shoudn't posit an "I" they should first focus on what thought is.

Descartes may know his God all too well: Meditation 4

Descartes discovers God, and with this discovery he finds that his existence is dependent on God's existence. Furthermore, he comes to find that he is absolutely certain of God's existence; in fact, he can "know nothing more evident or more certain." He believes that because of this he sees a way in which he can come to possess knowledge of other things:

"To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God."

This is the basis of why he believes, by using his intellect properly, he can be absolutely certain concerning all sorts of things:

"Next I experience that there is in me a certain faculty of judgment, which, like everything else that is in me, I undoubtedly received from God. And since he does not wish to deceive me, he assuredly has not given me the sort of faculty with which I could ever make a mistake when I use it properly."

Descartes' conception of God is perfection: eternal, omniscient, omnipresent, infinitely good, all-powerful, etc. It is easy for people to agree upon a definition of eternal, omniscient, and omnipresent; but it may be more difficult for people to agree on exactly what infinite goodness is, especially as it relates to an all-powerful being. Most have heard the phrase "God doesn't do things because they're just; actions are just because God does them." Does Descartes think so? If not, does the presence of a legitimate opposing opinion (if it is legitimate) bring into question his "certainty" of God's nature?

Descartes seems to draw his conception of God's goodness from an all too human standpoint. He reduces God's goodness to his own (Descartes') conception of goodness. Many theologians have asserted these points, although here I will pose them as questions: What if, being all-powerful, God has orchestrated the world according to his own master plan? And what if deception is a part of this plan? What if God's deceiving doesn't call into question his goodness, for what man can subject God’s actions to his conception of goodness? Ultimately, if God is all-powerful, things are good because he does them; and our conception of goodness, which may, as Descartes' does, involve deeming deception malicious, may be far from accurate as a description of God.

If it does indeed turn out that it is not a certitude that God would not deceive, then Descartes cannot rely completely on his intellect, even if he uses it properly.

Nature

In AT 82, Descartes says "My sole concern here is with what God has bestowed on me as a combination of mind and body." This would seem to me to mean that the mind and body are interconnected in terms of discovering or being revealed truth - that through the senses we can discover various truths. However, soon after the above comment, Descartes says "For knowledge of the truth about such things seems to belong to the mind alone, not the combination of the mind and body." Is this a reference to the fact that knowledge is stored in the mind, or that truth can only be understood through the existence of the mind? For example, if I put my hand on something extremely hot, I will burn myself. But without the knowledge that this produces a burn, my hand might be inclined to continue to place itself on the hot thing. Yes, Descartes does seem to see some sort of interconnectedness, but perhaps not in the discovering or retention of the knowledge of truth.

Why 'Intellectual' Substance?

"...for it is in the nature of a created intellect to lack understanding of many things, and it is in the nature of a created intellect to be finite." (AT60)

In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes compares the perfection of the intellect with the perfection of the will (or freedom of choice). He determines that the intellect is finite (as stated above) and that there are natures of which God is the author that the intellect is incapable of apprehending, but that this does not mean that God did not equip man with the necessary intellectual faculties to make correct judgments and choose the good wherever the good choice can be clearly and distinctly perceived by the intellect (this is a rough paraphrasing of the end of the meditation). So he resolves that the ability to do or not to do something (the freedom of choice), insofar as it obeys the intellect and chooses the good when such can be clearly and distinctly perceived and refrains from choosing when such cannot, seems to be the only perfect faculty of the mind (AT58).

Why, then, didn't Descartes base his notion of a pure substance distinct from things physical on the power of the will instead of a more broad concept such as the mind? Or, put differently, why refer to it as intellectual substance when the intellect is claimed to be finite and therefore defect and in some way not actually pure?

Perhaps this will become more clear with further reading, but maybe other people have had these same questions.

There is no I

Thought is.
vs.
I think; I exist.

Some of us are having trouble seeing how the latter could not be true, and some of us are having trouble seeing how the latter is a legitimate conclusion based on the first. I wanted to throw up a blog post so that we could all have a place to blog-comment our way to the truth.

Is the supposition that I am the "thing" (loosely speaking) that thinks unsubstantiated? Or can we merely conclude that there is thought? Why or why not?

For example:
A thought that came up in conversation after class: Perhaps the "I" and the "my" are superfluous. When I talk about "my" thoughts, I am really just talking about thoughts. When I talk about "your" thoughts, I'm not really talking about your thoughts, but a concept of mine that is a convenient representation of how your head works. Every thought is my thought; your thoughts, unable to be experienced, are not thoughts. Unfortunately, this brings us dangerously close to solipsism.

Substance Abuse

In Meditations, Descartes seems to be making the following "ontological" argument:
Df 1: Infinite substance is that which is eternal, immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myself and everything else (if anything else there be) (AT 45).
Df 2: [By inference] finite substance is any substance which is not infinite substance.
Axiom: If the objective reality of an idea does not exist in me, then solipsism is impossible (AT 42).
Ontological argument:
P1: I have the idea of finite and infinite substances.
P2: I am not eternal, immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and/or I did not create both myself and everything else (if anything else there be).
P3: By Df 1, I am not an infinite substance.
P4: By P3, the objective reality of the idea of infinite substance does not exist in me.
P5: By the Axiom, solipsism is impossible.

Also, a question: I am having problems with Descartes’ use of the word ‘substance;’ so far, it seems merely to mean ‘thing’ or ‘entity.’ Anyone found any interesting bits on this?

Two Worlds

In Part Five of his Discourse on Method, Descartes discusses and summarizes a treatise he had decided not to publish and its contents. Within this treatise he invents a new world in which “God had put no weight whatever in the matter of which it was constituted,” yet because of the laws of nature it falls into an order similar to that of our own planet (AT44). While this is possible to dismiss as Descartes simply trying to avoid religious persecution, I believe Descartes is making a much more important claim.

It is most likely that Descartes would agree with Bacon that the goal of the sciences is to understand and control nature, and even to be able to superinduce new properties onto it. Without some sort of natural order, this would not be possible. There is no way to understand chaos; it cannot be catalogued or organized. While his method begins with doubting in order to “avoid precipitation and prejudice,” Descartes never doubts the natural laws the sciences are founded in (AT18). A natural order is so essential to the foundation of his method and the sciences in general that Descartes sees no viable option in replacing it with chaos.

The Piece of Wax

Why does Descartes interrupt his second meditation to play with a piece of wax? Descartes is clearly not ready yet to talk about knowledge of the external world, so what is he doing here?

The first time I read this section, it seemed that Descartes’ observations, although reasonable, were not free from doubt. For example, Descartes claims that although most of wax’s physical properties—taste, shape, smell, color, size, solidity—change when the wax is heated, the same wax still remains. “It must be admitted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise” (20, AT30). Perhaps as we heat our piece of wax, invisible wax gnomes are secretly replacing bits of the solid wax with some other kind of non-wax liquid, tricking us into thinking we are holding molten wax. Is this objection ridiculous? Of course, but they remain logical possibilities; thus we could doubt that we ever hold the same piece of wax at any two times.

The second time I read this section, I realized that I was being sophistical and missing the point. Descartes isn’t trying to establish any claims about the external world, but our perception of things in the external world. We do not perceive the “thinghood” of a piece of wax through sight or feeling, but through thought. For example, we know that wax is a corporeal body, and thus extended in space.* Extension is not a property that we perceive by sight, for we will only experience but a few of the countless ways the wax can be arranged in space while still retaining its wax-ness. Indeed, we cannot even imagine all the ways the wax can be arranged: “I would not be making a correct judgment about the nature of wax unless I believed it capable of being extended in many more different ways than I will ever encompass in my imagination” (21, AT31). The thinghood of the piece of wax is not something we can see, but we instead perceive it in the unity of the wax’s appearances. This unity is something we perceive with our mind: “The perception I have of [the wax] is a case not of vision or touch or imagination… but of purely mental scrutiny” (21, AT31).

Now, if invisible wax gnomes exist, we are still perceiving incorrectly. But the clarity and distinctness that seems to accompany sensory experience (even if it is misleading) actually comes from the mind, not the senses.

*EDIT: A classmate approached me this morning to ask what I meant by "extension." As far as I can tell, extension for Descartes refers to the existence of the wax in three-dimensional space, and thus includes what we normally call "size" and "shape."

The unclear line between ontology and epistemology.

One of my concerns about Descartes is his methodology. Beginning his quest for truth, he seeks answers by, "rejecting as absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt." If the goal is to simply investigate and establish the fact that one does exists, Descartes is in the right to consider 'I think therefore I am' his first principle. Even though he does this, the line between ontology and epistemology is blurred. What I have trouble agreeing with is the fact that his whole epistemological methodology is based on an ontological claim. Of course, there are some obvious ties to both subjects that make them inseparable. I will not discuss them because my point has to do with only how Descartes thinks of those ties. He writes, "All the things that had ever entered my mind were not more true than the illusions of my dreams." He realizes that he can say something is nonetheless thinking those thoughts. Then, he concludes that, "[it is] a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true; but there is only some difficulty in observing well which those are that we conceive distinctly. It does not follow, after realizing that there is some thing that thinks, that one can take empirical sensations as true.

Although I don't agree with the progression of thought here, I do believe his first principle is accurate and that what we conceive very clearly is generally true. The problem is how he leaps from one to the other.

Relationship b/w certainity and evidence

While reading Descartes I wondered what is evidence?

In AT [18] he states when discussing his ways in which he will learn, “ the first was never to accept anything as true that I did not know evidently to be so…” Then in AT [19] he claims that only the mathematics have been able to find any demonstrations that had certain and evident reasoning.

Does Descartes mean that thoroughly self examined experience can be the equivalent to examples if said examples are certain? Even then what is certain? He puts great stress on this characteristic of knowledge but yet I cannot recall him addressing what is certain. To my knowledge mathematics do not support religion yet Descartes does. He only gives what things can be certain through his method. If I were to try and reason with one on what is certain I think it could be done with greater ease by defining (with the use of examples, like Descartes does) by what is not.

On the Soul

Descartes states in AT 33 "From this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is only to think, and that does not need any place or depend on any material thing in order to be ."

If the soul is not anchored to any physical land, why is our entire conception of the soul attributed to the physical anchor of our bodies? Descartes claims that dreaming one is in another body is proof of the soul's transcendence, but if the soul transcends the physical realm, why does our memory and experience not? Why does everything that we associate with our-selves derive its existence from this world? Moreover, our 'soul' is fixed to our body in a powerful manner, and to me dreams appear insufficient to end the reliance of thought on the body.

In the Spirit of the Reformation

While at AT14 Descartes maintains that he does not approve of "those confused and restless temperaments who... are always thinking up some new reformation," one cannot help but see many similarities between his reformation of the sciences and the reformation of the church. Specifically, we see that Descartes wishes to make science something taken up by the individual alone. One is to consult one's own reason and trust no other outside received opinions. Looking to the Reformers of the Church, we see the same attitude. Sick of the authority over the scripture given to the Priests of the Catholic Church, the Reformers claimed that every man had a right to read scripture and to have his own interpretation of it. It was through close personal reflection on the scriptures that one attained a relationship with God. It is likely that Descartes only maintains distance from them for political reasons, but we, who need not fear The Inquisition, can see that he and the Reformers share a spirit of individualism.

But are we really safe? Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition...

Geometry & God

In part four of his Discourse on Method, Descartes presents his argument for the existence of God by implementing basic geometry. He recognizes perfection in such principles as the angles of a triangle and the equidistance of the points on a sphere from the center. However, he realizes there are no such cases in the natural world of this perfection. Descartes reasons that the imperfect physical manifestations of these perfect shapes must come from a perfect being, God (36).

This (seemingly) simple explanation for the existence of God isn't quite enough for him to convince me. Could it not be possible that the these perfect shapes are discovered by man, through geometry, after man has observed the imperfect examples of nature? The perfection of these simple geometrical shapes do not seem enough to explain Descartes' conception of God: "infinite, eternal, immutable, all-knowing, all-powerful" (35). I fail to see how Descartes derive such a complex and powerful God out of this observation.

Is God or Does God?

Throughout his Discourse on Method, Descartes repeatedly focuses his attention on the traditional Christian notion of a creator God. All the same, Descartes forwards a rather non-traditional approach to the idea of natural law. As he notes in section 45 of Part II,

It is indeed more probable that God has made [the world] from the beginning such as it was to be […], so that although he had not given it, at the beginning, any other form than chaos, provided that having established the laws of nature he lent to it his assent to act as it customarily does, we can believe, without doing any injury to the miracle of creation, that […] all the things that are purely material could have rendered themselves in time such as we see them at present.

Essentially, Descartes is arguing that because God ordered the laws of nature in such a way as to develop and maintain themselves, one can promote a more scientific, dare I say, pre-evolutionary approach to the creation story wherein God sets the earth in motion, hurrying its natural processes, and, in turn, lets the earth develop as it naturally would if separated from Him, but still within the realm of His perfect will and ordinance.

But herein rests my question: Did God create the natural laws or did he merely set them to work in the natural world?

I take up this question as I think of the language used to quantify God’s nature according to Descartes’ Christian perspective. Essentially, God is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent. He was, is, and ever shall be. In short, God is all things good. He is a creator, but He was not created. By His nature, He cannot be anything other than the embodiment of the perfect things that, as Descartes would argue, give us proof that such a God exists. God does not, then, define perfection because He created it, He defines perfection because He is made up of it. Thus, since qualities like perfection, goodness, and truth were not created, they simply are as a result of the fact that God, whose nature encompasses them, is.

From this notion my question arises, what do we do with the natural laws? Did God out of his perfect and unlimited power create the rules of motion, sound, light, etc. or did He out of his perfect understanding set them to work in the world the only way in which they could? Are the laws of nature, like God himself, of a substance having always been?

I am honestly unsure of how Descartes would answer, and I am equally unsure of whether or not he would think this question merits an answer. All the same, it seems to me that if God is, in fact, perfection and not simply the author thereof, so also would the products of his nature be perfection. But then again, what about the problem of humanity?

P.S. My apologies to PC users for the earlier font confusion.

Final thoughts on Bacon and a first impression of Descartes

This course’s progression from Francis Bacon to Rene Descartes has been appropriate because of nature of their stylistic differences. Unlike Bacon, Descartes’ philosophical works are aimed for a scholarly audience as well as the general public. Despite this, Descartes maintains depth in his colloquial style. The “history or fable” approach he utilizes supplies his readers with provocative insights. In comparison, Bacon executes prolepsis effectively, but I find Descartes holistically more persuasive due to clarity. Bacon provides to be a difficult “guide” to follow through many of his ambiguous aphorisms. For instance, the reference to “Magic” as “the practical division of metaphysics” found in aphorism 9 of book two is an insufficient explanation. I would be much more satisfied with Bacon if he would expand on these seemingly arbitrary claims. Descartes’ primary contribution to my scholarship thus far is his ability to resolve the many questions I raised after reading Bacon. Descartes’ first principal of “I think therefore I am” in section four is a more substantial foundation than Bacon’s method of self-contradictory deduction which must assume each category of Form exists to evaluate it. I speculate that Descartes’ logic will continue to have more structure as class advances.

Descartes and Doubt

“Among these, one of the first that I was drawn to consider was that often there is less perfection in works composed of several pieces and made by the hand of diverse masters than in those at which one alone has worked. Thus one sees that buildings undertaken and completed by a single architect are customarily more beautiful and better ordered than those that several have tried to refashion by making use of old walls that had been built for other ends.” (21)

In the first three parts of his Discourse, Descartes (like Bacon in Book I of The New Organon) seems to be engaged in explaining 1) why old foundations and forms of knowledge are not to be trusted; and 2) where we should look for true and certain knowledge. The answer to both of these inquiries is implied in the building metaphor quoted above: old foundations of knowledge and inquiry are diverse and do not tend towards the same end (“one can imagine nothing so strange and inconceivable that it has not been said by some philosopher [23-4]) and we have only our individual selves to rely on when constructing new foundations (or at least we have Descartes the individual to rely on). Descartes repeats numerous times that he is not intent on tearing down all the walls and foundations of the ancient “city” of knowledge in which he was reared and rebuilding it from the ground up, he merely intends to do it with regard to himself and his own ways of thinking (of course, it seems he intends for his analysis to serve as a model): “…as regards all the opinions that I had hitherto accepted as credible, I could not do better than to undertake to reject them once and for all and replace them afterwards by better ones…when I had adjusted them to the standard of reason”. (22) To this end, Descartes proposes four precepts by which to govern his thought, the first of which (“never to accept anything as true that I did not know evidently to be so…” [25]) is most important for this post. My question, then, is that if Descartes truly takes this precept to heart, how and why does he not only continue to adhere to Christianity, but do so “provisionally”? The case could be made, as it was in our discussion of Bacon, that it would be dangerous, given the political and religious climate at the time, for Descartes to doubt the Christian principles on which he was raised, despite the fact that it was not something he could not know it to be true “evidently”. But the fact that he accepts it “provisionally” seems to suggest something different from the case of Bacon: it seems as if it is something which could potentially be disputed and shown to be false, whereas in Bacon, it seemed to be merely a moot point as religion had little or no impact on his own method (or at least, so says I). I know a doubting of religion (and of everything) is coming later, but as regards the method being described in the Discourse, it seems pertinent to ask whether he would be more consistent if he rendered unto faith what is faith’s (as Bacon does), or else doubt religion, along with everything else, from the get-go rather than “provisionally” accepting Christianity under the guise that it will help “not remain irresolute” in his actions. Or am I reading too much into “provisionally”?