Sunday, April 4, 2010

Hume and The Divided Line

I would like to make the claim that Hume is not as radicalas he first appears. I think that the major epistemological claims being made can be found in Plato's works. To paint the broad strokes that make up An Enquiry, I think we can summarize the book into a large 'If, Then' statement: IF Hume's epistemology is correct, THEN we must do away with Knowledge in the strict sense (this includes knowledge of metaphysics, principles of nature, cause and effect, and in short everything that is not sensed).

Hume's epistemological claims are founded on the conception that "all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions." Hume say that there are two types of perception. The first is experience or impression. This includes things sensed, and emotions felt. The second type of perception is thought or idea. All thoughts and ideas have their origin in experience and nowhere else (except for the occasional inference of shades of blue which need not concern us here). In examining the form of the book, one realizes that Hume spends a relatively short amount of time defending the IF portion of the book and a relatively large amount of time defending the THEN portion of the book. The reason he does this is because undoubtledy historical. Hobbes and other moderns seem to agree on this epistemological point quite readily. It seems, however, that the IF is the more important and fundamental claim, and that is the claim whch deserves the most attention.

I am makng the claim that Hume should have spent more time defending the IF claims, because Plato already implied Hume's results in his analogy of the Divided Line. Plato's Divided Line divides all possible information of anything into 4 distinct ways. Starting with the bottom we have Imagination, Belief, Thought, and finally Understanding. Ignoring what Hume has to say about mathematical knowledge, Hume claims that all access we have to things outside of ourselves is through what Plato calls Belief. We then form ideas which (seemingly) correspod to what Plato calls imagination. By saying this Plato implied 2,000+ years ago that if all we have is sense knowledge, we can never do metaphysics, or have any Knowledge in the strict sense of the word. Knowledge is a function of the soul, while belief is something we form out of sense data. Granting Hume the IF portion of his book, I think Plato would heartily agree that custom (or belief) is how we "know" metaphysics and cause/effect. Although they should have spent more time defending their IF claims, the modern philosophers are casting the burden of proof back on the Platonists and Aristotelians. It is now their job, not to start debates about the THEN portion of Hume's argument (for this is already accepted if one trusts the Divided Line), but to show that we have access to things other than through our senses and that our souls have faculties which the modern epistemology cannot account for.

2 comments:

  1. Of course, it's not only that we may have "access to things other than through our senses" that the Platonist must show, they must have a way to discuss these things without bringing reason to a place where she is no longer comfortable. In short, they must be able to discuss these things without ambiguity. According to the IF statement, we can't do that; it surpasses the limits of the understanding. Of course this claim is more than just a claim; It's an observation: when we attempt to discuss metaphysics, we are carried to the absurd and contradictory, a place where we can no longer rely on our faculties to carry us further.

    The burden of proof, in short, for the Platonists and Aristotelians, is quite a burden. They must make propositions that avoid the Pyrrhonian problematic. Hume admits that there is some principle by which we relate cause and effect. Instead of attributing it to reason (because this would imply that we can actually talk about it--and we seemingly can't without contradicting ourselves), he attributes it to custom. This is Hume's account for access to those things we supposedly gain through our soul. It is an account that is reasonable, can be discussed, and seems to be confirmed by experience. The IF statement is stronger than it may seem.

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  2. When I say "THis is Hume's account for access to those things we supposedly gain through our soul," I of course didn't mean to imply that Hume accounted for ALL the things that some of the ancients said we gained through our souls. Hume's account obviously limits this access.

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