It has been commonplace for many of these modern philosophers to refer to philosophy as a science, or to liken it to a science. Kant is no different. In fact, his primary goal is to make a science out of metaphysics. But what if he is doomed from the start? What if someone (Plato) had already excluded metaphysics from the realm of science, for good reason?
I acknowledge Kant's reasons for wanting to make metaphysics a science. He sees the success of mathematics and the natural sciences, and is envious. They have made such great progress. They are (mostly) unified. They command great respect among people; people recognize them as important and necessary pursuits. Then he turns to metaphysics and sees nothing but (what appears to him to be) sophistry and confusion. Huge edifices built on unstable foundations. Opinions taken for certainty.
Kant resolves that for progress to be made in metaphysics, reason, the faculty by which we do work in metaphysics, must be critiqued, and a new method of discovery must be employed once reason's powers have been discovered. Kant borrows the "strict method of the celebrated Wolff," which requires that secure progress for a science can only be attained through "orderly establishment of principles, clear determination of concepts, insistence upon strictness of proof, and avoidance of venturesome, non-consecutive steps in our inferences." (2nd Preface, B xxxvi, pg. 33) Surely this is a fine methodology to adopt in order to establish metaphysics as a science.
But perhaps there is something self-deceiving about adopting a scientific attitude towards metaphysics. Maybe progress in metaphysics cannot be built on "orderly established principles." Could it be that instead we should proceed by treating our principles not as orderly and established, but as hypotheses, and whats more, as fallible ones? If we choose to proceed, not sure that we are right, but hopeful that we may be right, is it possible that we may be able to get closer to the thing-in-itself, or immortality, or God?
Honestly, there problems with this method as well. People grow attached to their metaphysical speculation, and where they once held a sort of healthy scepticism towards their principles, they consider them rigid and fixed. This can be seen in any of the "ism" schools. Platon-ism, Aristotelian-ism, and Thom-ism, are all just examples of people who began to trust and rely on their founder's metaphysical assumptions, and Kant sees this as a problem that squelches real progress in philosophy. But if we can consider the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, or Thomas, free of their "ism's," is it possible that one, or all of them, can contribute to a fuller understanding of metaphysics? In short, does the study of metaphysics lend itself more to Wolff's rigid methodology, or to Plato's dialectic?
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It seems to me that Kant follows Wolff's methodology rather than that of dialectic because he is attempting to define metaphysics as a science, which requires objective universality (for the most part). Two people engaged in dialectic agree that whatever claims they come to are true only insofar as the grounds they are based on are true as well. To Kant, this is not enough to ground a science upon. So he sets about establishing principles and providing proofs for them to eliminate any possibility of conceding claims that may or may not be valid. In short, he is using the method that he believes to be most secure.
ReplyDeleteBut, it is always possible that metaphysics cannot be tamed into a science, thus rendering Kant no closer to truth than any of those who came before him.
Nice post. I think Kant will say what you say about hoping things are true and entertaining them as "regulative" ideas (what you call hypotheses) in the latter half of the book. But there are other metaphysical claims that can be established with certainty, namely all those that make experience possible. God is not a condition for the possibility of experience, but a regulative idea we use in order to view our experiences under a new moral light. That means metaphysics, as a science, gives up proofs of God but accepts proofs of causality.
ReplyDeleteI think that Plato and Aristotle differ substantially in their understanding of dialectic and hypothesis (and metaphysics) when compared with Kant. But what you have said Kant should do is something Kant would accept I think. Strict proof only applies where it is possible. Where it is not possible, where metaphysics is not a science, Kant still thinks it worthwhile to approach metaphysical ideas as regulative. I.e. reason points toward a wholeness that lies beyond experience and our task is not to take this as proof but see how we can make it useful to experience. IN the end, utility in experience MUST be the judge of everything for Kant, even metaphysics. Plato and Aristotle would of course disagree.