In paragraph 7 of “Of Liberty and Necessity,” Hume notes a uniformity of the human condition that renders history, intellectually speaking, rather useless. He states, “Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. It’s chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior” (76). While Hume seems, at other times, rather detached from the idea of a regulated understanding of human actions in relation to moral qualities, he seems to make an exception in this passage. By pointing out the role history plays in teaching some men lessons about how other men really are, Hume recognizes the notion of an objective moral standard for humanity and the ways in which that standard is directly linked to history’s task. He points out that just as when in nature every effect has its cause, every human action has some lesson it teaches about the nature of man and some cause from which that said human nature is derived. Hume, thus, seems to posit, in this passage, that his principled notions of Determinism are, in some way, inexorably linked to the events and ramifications of human nature in history.
Going further, Hume later notes the role of history, in teaching people the character of human nature, to “regulate our future conduct” as people in society (77). In doing so, Hume seems to be arguing that the purpose of history is, above all, to provide mankind with a sort of moral compass, enlivened by the knowledge of who and what and how men really are. In a way, Hume points out how history should, in its proper context and use, examine the mistakes of human nature committed by leaders of the past to transform our understanding of the present and alter the way we go about dealing with the same issues in the future. But is Hume’s reckoning inconsistent with his further assertions concerning the nature of human understanding? And how would Hume justify his notion of history as a tool of morality in relation to God’s sovereignty? Is history, if the world is set in motion and regulated by the divine providence of the Almighty, influenced by the actions of men at all?
I don't see the problem here. What is the possible inconsistency of his account of history and his account of human understanding?
ReplyDeleteFurther why even ask the last two questions about God in this context? Since you can't demonstrate anything concerning them, they can't effect the reasonableness of Hume's assertions about the use of history.
That's just the point. I don't know what the problem here is, nor do I have a complete argument about Hume's inconsistency, if there is any. I only meant to imply that it seems odd that Hume should point out the failings of history in one passage and then rely on it to give weight to his perspective on human understanding in another. All the same, this post is, in many ways, a quandary in search of explanation. It is merely a thought, though clearly one deriving from affectation. Thank you for your just critique.
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