The interplay between impression and customary conjunction is an interesting one. Hume makes it very clear that any reliable, believable idea must refer to some innate impression, be it "outward or inward." This means that when we speak of ideas, we must restrict our conversation to those which appear strongly and vividly to us, those that we "hear, or see, or love, or hate, or desire, or will" (Section 2, para. 3). Hume deals with the objection that this way of thinking renders action impossible (because it denies cause and effect) by maintaining that we are still able to formulate a belief based on customary conjunction. A tends to follow B in every case that we have experienced, and while we do not claim to be able to predict that A will follow B, we can still act on our belief that it is probable that A will follow B.
While this helps Hume avoid any accusations of "sceptical paralysis," things become more complicated when we consider the subjective value each individual ascribes to these events. Take this example:Alfred loves spending money on other people, but gift-giving is not important to Benita. When Alfred and Benita both see the same person give a gift to a friend, they react quite differently. Alfred may go over and congratulate the gift-giver, or even praise his generosity, while Benita may not even notice the event, and certainly will not act on it.
How then, does Hume wish us to judge the characters of these people? The sight of generosity resounds deeply with Alfred, but Benita is not excited by it at all, if she even notices the act. The same thing has appeared lively to one person, and faintly to another. It seems that Hume would have a difficult time putting together any kind of consistent ethical or political system. What, in Hume's terms, is the reason to believe in that system's standards should it not appear strongly and vividly to each and every person?
He would judge the characters based on the value impressed on him by his society,right? In some cases it would hardly matter whether or not one could pass judgment (gift-giving), for this hardly concerns that majority of people. In these cases there is likely to be a sub-culture custom accordinhg to which the individual holds views. But in cases concerning how one felt about murder, theft, etc., there is likely to be an overwhelming majority who has inherited through custom the sentiment that these things are bad and that the characters who act in these ways are vicious.
ReplyDeleteIn short, he wishes to judge the characters just as we tend to judge them in our everyday life. Nature is too strong for principle; if the "problem of subjective value" were really a problem, we'd really be in trouble.
Morality and value, like anything else, must be based on impressions, though this time it is -internal- impressions instead of external. Hume is responsible for the radical is-ought distinction, which means that for Hume morality could not be based on anything else, because the is-statements of reason cannot translate into action.
ReplyDeleteI don't think the fact that different people have different inner impressions is a problem--it just means that different people will judge other people differently. As it happens, that is actually the case in the world.
I think most people (including Benita) would agree, however, that it is far more morally praiseworthy to recognize that other people have different values and to respect those values. Thus I think if, say, Benita and Alfred were siblings, then my inner impressions tell me it would be far more divine if Benita recognized how important gift-giving was to Alfred and had the empathy to respect that wish every once and a while, even if she didn't see any good reason for his sentiment.
If you are worried about the sociopath, who is incapable of the above kind of empathizing and might not have -any- moral sentiments, I don't think Hume can do much about it. But, as it happens, he inflames -our- moral passions, and we will judge him to be immoral for lacking those sentiments. Is it reasonable? No. But neither is morality, for Hume.