In this post I will explore what kind of philosophy may be pursued after Hume or if one becomes a Humean. (I am defining philosophy as the search for knowledge of Truth, and the philosopher as one who seeks it.) After making my view on skepticism clear in our last class session (and in Philologoi, and in general), this is not a diatribe against skepticism or about how skepticism could or could not work - I intend to carry out a sincere investigation into what might become of philosophy post-Hume.
What we know: external (immediate) sensation, internal sensation (emotions), numbers and quantity, memory, and logic.
What we learn according to custom: ideas (those that include things outside of mere memory), morality, and pretty much anything not on the knowledge list.
I want to determine where this leaves philosophers and whether being a philosopher would differ from not being a philosopher.
What can a philosopher do? First, he can go through Hume's system. Realizing that abstract thoughts other than quantity and number are mere "sophistry and illusion" (12, §34), one can make a lot of bonfires. But after this, what shall we do? Studying physical sciences seem like an option, albeit with the catch that none of science's inferences could actually be confirmed. Moral philosophy also seems like a trope, for all morality is based on sentiment (7, footnote a; 12, §34), and sentiment changes according to custom (or per individual).
I am concerned that in reality, all a philosopher is able to do is act like nothing happened. He knows what he cannot know (causation, god, universals), but he continues to act according to custom, which is built on these rejected concepts. Hume insists that Nature will inevitably win over abstract reasoning (5, §2; 12, §21), for "Nature is always too strong for principle" (12, §23). If the purpose of philosophy is to seek Truth, which inevitably includes principles, philosophers are left with naught.
Maybe this is the way it must be. Then, so be it. But is there, then, a difference between a Humean (who is called a philosopher), and an everyday common man? Should we be Humeans at all? Or, are we better off among the rabble, who--regardless of whether they are concerned with Truth--act according to custom just like Humeans?
I have no answer. There is always something to be said for becoming educated. So, maybe that is the way to go. But upon that answer I ask, "Is a Humean a philosopher at all?" Maybe he is insofar as he becomes a Humean--at that point he is still searching for Truth. But once he realizes Truth about anything other than sensation, number, logic, and memory is unattainable, may he be considered a philosophos? Of this I have serious doubts.
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If Hume were correct and those who studied Hume became Humeans, there is certainly a difference between the Humean and the common man: one knows that he doesn't know (and cannot know) and the other (most likely) thinks he does know and doesn't know. This is the difference between Socrates and his interlocuters, between the Humean and the common man.
ReplyDeleteThe one searching for truth, after coming face to face with Hume, has 3 options:
1) He can attempt to defeat Hume: If he does, he may only survive with remnants of his former dogmatic conclusions and so pursue truth in a different way (a revised way) than he did before confronting Hume (Kant). Or he may, if he falsifies Hume's every word, continue as he did beforehand.
2)He can ignore Hume: If he chooses this option with no other reason than that to accept Hume has consequences which he is not willing to accept for himself, I doubt anyone would call this man a philosophos. For isn't it obvious that this man has his own idea of what truth should look like and is unwilling to accept anything else, regardless of its validity?
3) If he can't defeat him, he may accept Hume: Realizing that Hume is correct and humbling himself to an argument that necessitates assent, he shows his humility with respect to truth and accepts Hume and the consequences that necessarily follow. I do not think that such a respect for truth would exclude the one from being a lover, or even a pursuer of truth. He may still pursue truth within the limits ascribed him by nature, and in this way not waste his time contemplating the unknowable--that is, no longer deceive himself.
Regarding Hume as philosophos: Aristotle believed that the highest objects of philosophy were those which Hume deemed unknowable and worthless to inquire about, and that the philosopher pursued these objects. Obviously, there is a problem calling Hume a philosopher in this way. But if a lover of wisdom is a lover of truth, than he must accept the consequences of reasonable conclusions when they are necessitated. To exclude Hume from being a philosophos because he (might have) successfully demonstrated the unknowability of those speculiative objects which some of the ancients held the highest is to subject Hume to a definition of the word philosopher that included the study of and respect for those objects that Hume deemed unknowable. It is of course no surprise that Hume is not a philosophos defined as such.
4) He can humbly realize there is another way to acquire Truth than mere sense perception: a phenomenon emerging in the modern era that should make one suspicious of Hume's starting point. Good thing sensation is not our only epistemological resource--matter with its shifting nature could never lend itself to such a noble task as Truth.
ReplyDeleteThis should shed light onto the rightful definition of philosophos: the Truth Aristotle is after is different than the truth Hume is after.
Mr. Smith: I strongly disagree with your Hume/Socrates analogy. That Socrates does not know and does not claim to know is not the only difference he has with his interlocutors, whereas I think this is the only difference Hume has with the common man. Socrates acts (key word) differently than his contemporaries. In fact, this is why they killed him (neither impiety nor corrupting the youth are thought-crimes). The apology is an entire dialogue in which Socrates recounts the way in which he acted differently and more nobly than his contemporaries. The same cannot be said about Hume. In fact, Hume says, "Nature is too strong for principle" (p.140). Hume insists that one must be a mitigated skeptic because one can't actually live by the logical outcomes of full-blown skepticism.
ReplyDeleteSocrates never ceased searching for what makes a just act actually just, while Hume has already given an answer. He says that all of morality is merely sentiment. While Socrates looked for the ways in which we gain knowledge, Hume has already given us the dogmatic answer: we gain knowledge through sense experience and nothing else.
This brings me to my big concern with skepticism of the Humean variety: one is condemned to the active-life of the mundane and the average. For Hume, ideas are merely the after-effect of a sense experience. They have no weight in real life. Although the Humean can still look for truth, until he finds it, he will live by whatever custom is prevalent in his day. The Humean may think differently than others, but he must live like a cultural relativist: "Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever" (p.42). The Humean has no reason to make inferences or trust philosophers/religion and thus he is relegated to acting based on custom.
Ms. Somma: Your fourth option is not a fourth option, but rather the consequences of defeating Hume. To skip to the consequences of defeating Hume without defeating him is categorized under the 2nd option(ignoring Hume), in which case those consequences listed under option 2 above naturally follow.
ReplyDeleteMr. York: I agree that the Socrates/Hume analogy was a bit strong. But that Socrates searches in those ways Hume showed to be fruitless is no objection to Hume(obviously).
Also, your big concern with Humean skepticism is not a question of the validity of Hume, but rather of the consequences of Hume. The consequences of Hume may be reason to question him, but they are in no way an objection to him. In short, your big concern does not concern what would need to be concerned to defeat Hume. Confronting Hume, if you can't defeat him, assent is necessary. To refuse assenting to Hume because of the consequences is to continue searching for truth in a way Hume has proven fruitless. This is deceiving onself--or is it? For this person knows what he is doing. I suppose that this is rather willed ignorance (and what a lover of truth this person would be!).
Also, Ms. Somma, defeating Hume was the first option (forgot to mention that).
ReplyDeleteMr. Smith: If being a true lover of wisdom requires me to behave like a cultural relativist, then I would no longer declare myself a lover of wisdom. If I were forced to choose, I would, like Nietzsche, take life over truth. Thankfully, I do not believe that there can be a difference between the True and the Good. If one gets to a position where he must say that the True and the Good are separated by an epistemological void, then perhaps one should say that this is an absurd conclusion and, like Hume does in his free will chapter, reject the premises. Or maybe its just better to choose life. In short: If being a Humean requires me to act in a mundane way and follow nothing but tradition, I shall cast off the search for truth and begin the search for life. Of course, I am still not convinced that they are different.
ReplyDeleteMr. Smith--here's my clarification.
ReplyDeleteOption 1 requires that we defeat Hume. This would be to falsify his if/then. Option 4, that we disagree with him and place him within our current system.
His problematic is only a problematic if we agree with his premises.
IF we agree that sense-experience is our sole epistemological resource, THEN we get Hume.
I am rejecting his IF, and therefore, may leave his THEN as it is--neither refuting it nor being affected by it.
Ms. Somma: Yes. I think you're right. If one does not see Hume's problematic as a problematic for good reason, she may proceed in her previous way.
ReplyDeleteIn short, In order to engage Hume, one must have reason to engage Hume. If the very problems Hume is dealing with are based upon epistemological assumptions that one needn't accept (for good reason), there is no reason to even discuss Hume. And this person may pass by Hume unaffected and with her integrity maintained.
Mr. York: I must admit, unlike you, that I am not certain that the true and the good are the same.
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ReplyDeleteEven if Hume is right, I still think there is a lifelong philosophical task to be undertaken. Human beings have a strong tendency to make statements of the kind Hume states we can have no knowledge of. So the chief task of the Humean philosopher is to turn inward and assent to only that which he knows can be true, to attack his previously held dogmatic beliefs. This kind of doubt is not easy, nor will it come quickly. It requires much discipline and self-knowledge. And even once we attain this kind of hexis, we still have to constantly keep ourselves there, which takes work as well.
ReplyDelete